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Abstract 
 
Shareholder primacy is the most fundamental concept in corporate law and 
corporate governance. It is widely embraced in the business, legal, and academic 
communities. Economic analysis and policy arguments advance a normative theory 
that corporate managers should maximize shareholder wealth. Academic literature 
invariably describes shareholder primacy as a “norm.” But whether the concept is 
“law” is contested because, remarkably, we still do not have a coherent legal theory. 
Our understanding of a fundamental tenet of the field is flawed and incomplete. 
This article presents a positive legal theory of shareholder primacy. It answers the 
questions: Is shareholder primacy law? What form of law is it? How does it work? 
The core prescription to maximize profit is misunderstood as a social norm because 
it cannot be in the form of an enforceable rule, the framework of a board’s fiduciary 
duty. Such form of law would be internally incoherent with the structure of 
corporate law. However, to influence behavior the concept of law is not limited to a 
rule‒sanction form. Pervasive judicial acceptance of a principle can legitimate a 
rule and thus impose a strong internal sense of obligation. This article conducts the 
first empirical study of case law discussing profit maximization for the period 1900 
to 2016. It shows that shareholder primacy has become a Hartian obligation and a 
rule of law. The rule does not exist in a single locus duty, but instead is a 
filamentary principle that weaves through many other rules of corporate law and 
the architecture of the corporate and market systems. This article shows how the 
obligation, albeit unenforceable, is efficacious nonetheless.   
                                                                                                                                     
  John H. and Mary Lou Dasburg Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin 
College of Law. This paper was presented at a faculty colloquium at the University of 
Florida Levin College of Law. I thank Jonathan Cohen, Mark Fenster, Amy Mashburn, Lars 
Noah, William Page, and D. Daniel Sokol for their helpful comments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A foundational concept of corporate law and corporate governance is 
the principle of shareholder primacy. It expresses the idea that shareholders 
have the priority interest in both economics and governance of the 
corporation: shareholders are said to be the principal in a principal-agent 
relationship on whose behalf the corporate enterprise serves.1 Shareholder 
primacy instructs the board to manage the corporation solely for the 
purpose of maximizing shareholder wealth.  
The shareholder wealth maximization norm is important because it 
goes to the most basic question in the field of corporate law: What is the 
purpose of the corporation and corporate law? The broad canvass 
answer―corporations are wealth-producing socioeconomic legal constructs 
that should profit shareholders―is without controversy. Only when we 
                                                                                                                                     
1  See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 545 (2000).  
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examine the question deeper does it reveal important social implications.2 
Should shareholder profit be maximize at the expense of all other interests? 
Are efficiency and equity irreconcilable? What about externalities and 
ethics? Are there social obligations within a complex democratic market 
system? Is shareholder profit related to social inequity? These questions do 
not have easy normative answers, both in the theory of the corporation and 
in the practice of corporate governance. The debate is as old as the dawn of 
the modern corporation and has persisted over many generations of 
economic history and academic scholarship.3  One side of the argument 
answers that the sole obligation of a corporate manager is to maximize 
shareholder profit within the bounds of lawful activity.4 Others disagree, 
arguing that shareholder profit need not always take priority over other 
interests or consideration.5  
Despite persistent criticism, the idea of shareholder primacy has been 
                                                                                                                                     
2  The debate on corporate purpose has modern constitutional and socio-political 
dimensions. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
3  Compare these debates in the 1930s, 1960s, and 1990s. See A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (managers should exercise 
power “only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (corporation “has a 
social service as well as a profit-making function”); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM 133 (1962) (there is “only one social responsibility of business―to use it resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits”); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE 
NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 24-25 (1967) (economists and businesspersons “have abandoned, 
however tacitly, their commitment to maximization”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense 
of Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1423, 1425 (1993) (defending shareholder primacy); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as 
Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409, 1411 
(1993) (proposing stakeholder theory).  
4  See , e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle 
with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155, 171 
(2012) (embracing Milton Friedman’s idea and arguing “corporate law requires directors, 
as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for 
the stockholders”); supra note 3. 
5  See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Framing a Purpose for Corporate Law, 39 J. CORP. L. 713, 
720 (2014); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013); 
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS 
INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012); Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for 
Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National 
Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 735-36 (2010); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in 
Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006); Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); supra note 3. 
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widely accepted.6 However, its legal status remains uncertain even today. 
This is an unsatisfactory state of knowledge, all the more conspicuous since 
the field of corporate law has been well developed in law and scholarship. 
Shareholder primacy is said to be a central tenet of corporate governance. 
It is invariably described by corporate law scholars as a “norm,” but seldom 
“law.” Critics diminish it further to an “ideology” or “dogma.” 7  Even 
advocates consistently describe it as a social norm.8 Other than undue and 
hackneyed debate around an old Michigan case,9 we lack a legal theory of 
shareholder primacy. The debate on shareholder primacy is had at the level 
of policy and economic rationale, advancing normative arguments for or 
against the idea.   
This is the first article to advance a complete and coherent legal theory 
of shareholder primacy. It answers these basic questions: Is shareholder 
primacy law? If it is, how does the law work (achieve compliance)? To 
answer these questions, this article conducts the first empirical review of 
judicial discussion of shareholder profit maximization in the era of the 
modern corporation, the period 1900‒2016. This review shows that courts 
have pervasively embraced the concept that corporate managers should 
maximize shareholder wealth.  
This article posits that shareholder primacy cannot be stated as a pithy 
rule of law and enforceable sanction. Such a legal form would irreconcilably 
conflict with other foundational rules of the corporate system. A basic 
aspect of corporate law as we know it―the separation of ownership and 
control―would become incoherent. The inability to find a precise locus of 
law does not mean that law does not exist. Shareholder primacy is not a 
norm originating from a shared belief in the community, independent of 
legal origin or influence. It is law obligating managers to maximize value. 
It exists as a filament of the corporate system, weaving through various the 
architecture of the corporate system, its rules of law, corporate governance 
practices, and market mechanisms. Judicial recognition of the concept of 
shareholder primacy has created a Hartian obligation that is a part of 
                                                                                                                                     
6  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (“There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that 
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”); infra 
note 55.  
7  STOUT, supra note 5, at 2 (“ideology”); David Millon, Shareholder Primacy in the 
Classroom After the Financial Crisis, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 191, 192 (2013) (“dogma”).  
8  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. 
Ford, 3 VA. J. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008); Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1423.  
9  Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
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corporate law.10  
This article does not advance a normative theory of shareholder wealth 
maximization or advance the idea that shareholder primacy promotes an 
equitable or responsible society. The normative arguments for and against 
have been well developed in legal, business, and economic scholarship. 
This article presents a positive legal theory explaining the structure of a 
complex law. The question—“what is the law?”—has not received 
sufficient empirical or theoretical analyses. This article contributes to the 
literature by presenting the first complete, coherent theory of positive law 
of shareholder primacy: The theory explains the reason why shareholder 
primacy must be in a form of law without sanctions and the precise 
mechanism by which the law has influenced managerial behavior toward 
compliance. 11  The academic, policy, and legal communities, including 
courts, are served by a better understanding of shareholder primacy’s legal 
foundation and its cause and effect on the economic system.  
Before starting the analysis, this article notes an important definitional 
distinction that is central to the theory advanced here. Although scholars 
sometimes use the terms duty and obligation interchangeably,12 this article 
distinguishes them. Duty is defined in the doctrinal sense of a cognizable 
fiduciary duty subjecting directors or others to legal sanction for breach.13 
Obligation is defined in the jurisprudential sense of a government 
prescription that is not attached to a sanction, though it is a form of law.14 
In short, the theory of law advanced here is that while there is no duty to 
maximize profit, courts have imposed an obligation to do so and this 
prescription is efficacious even though it is unenforceable. This obligation 
                                                                                                                                     
10  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (3d ed. 2012).  
11  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 
1263 (1999) (“The process by which norms originate and are adopted as a result of changes 
in actors’ belief-systems is extremely important generally, and is of special importance in 
explaining the origin and adoption of many norms that are significant in corporate law.”); 
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 
1647 (2000) (“What are the mechanisms by which law influences behavior apart from the 
deterrent effect of state sanctions? That question remains a fertile area for further 
investigation.”).   
12  See, e.g., Leslie Green, Law and Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, at 514 n.1 (eds. Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, 2002). 
Some fields of law make a clear distinction. For example, non-corporate business entity 
statutes distinguish duty and obligation, wherein duty refers to fiduciary duty and 
obligation refers to some other legal commitment. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. LIMITED LIAB. CO. 
ACT § 409(a),(d) (2006); UNIF. LIMITED P'SHIP ACT § 408(a),(d) (2001); REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP 
ACT § 404(a),(d) (1997). See also Gerber v. Enterprise Products Holdings, LLC, 67 A.3d 400, 
418-19 (Del. 2013) (explaining the difference between fiduciary duty and the obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing).  
13  See infra note 36.  
14  See infra Section IV.B. (presenting a theory of an obligation as law).  
2017 LEGAL THEORY OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 6 
 
is the law of shareholder primacy. This article unpacks how this idea works 
in the practice of corporate governance.  
This article is organized into four sections. Section I presents the current 
understanding of shareholder primacy as a social norm, and it explains the 
core tension between shareholder primacy and managerial authority in the 
structure of corporate law. Section II discusses rules of law and legal aspects 
that partially advance the effect of shareholder primacy, including the law’s 
treatment of inter-security conflicts, sale of corporate control, the market for 
corporate control, and executive pay. Section III presents empirical data 
from federal and states cases discussing the concept of shareholder profit 
maximization from 1900 to 2016. Section IV advances a complete and 
coherent theory of positive law, showing the mechanism by which courts 
and the legal system have created an obligation that, albeit unenforceable, 
is efficacious nonetheless.  
 
I.   THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL THEORY  
 
Shareholder primacy is a legal enigma. It is a fundamental tenet of 
corporate law.15 Yet, its legal authority seems strangely scant. In other fields 
of law, foundational laws are apparent in the primary sources of law. Every 
field has them. 16  The first statutes enacting a fundamental concept are 
modeled. 17  Progenitor cases are frequently cited and relied upon as 
authority.18 Shareholder primacy is different. It is difficult to find the locus 
of law, either a well-established body of case law or a specific statute 
imposing a duty to comply with the command. Due to this real legal 
ambiguity, shareholder primacy has been debate principally on policy 
grounds and its legal status has been vigorously contested.   
                                                                                                                                     
15  See Grant Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder 
Franchise, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1217, 1218 n.1 (2009) (“normative foundation for modern 
corporate law theory”); Douglas R. Cole, E-Proxies for Sale? Corporate Vote-Buying in the 
Internet Age, 76 WASH. L. REV. 793, 831 n.192 (2001) (“central tenet of traditional corporate 
law”).  
16  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 
162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1028); Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854); Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).  
17  For example, virtually every state has enacted a version of the uniform partnership 
laws. See REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1997); UNIF. P'SHIP ACT (1914).  
18  For example, Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.), stating the 
standard for a partner’s fiduciary duty of loyalty, has been cited 1,144 time in federal and 
state court opinions as of November 22, 2016.  
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A. Whither the Law  
 
The uncertain legal status is seen when one searches for legal authority 
in the traditional way that lawyers find the law: cases, statutes, and 
regulations stating a command, prohibition, or permission. Shareholder 
primacy seems to exist not as a pinpoint citation, but in the ether. It is real 
in that no one disputes the sense of obligation in the boardroom and 
executive suites, but finding the law’s command is elusive. No corporation 
statute of the fifty states imposes a duty on the board to manage a business 
corporation to maximize shareholders wealth. All corporation statutes 
simply provide that the corporation may engage in any lawful activity.19 In 
fact, a substantial number of statutes provide the opposite―that the board 
may consider the interests of constituents beyond shareholders.20  
Case law imposing a duty to maximize profit is so scant that there is 
hackneyed over-reliance on Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., a 1919 case from 
Michigan.21 The case famously involved a dispute between Henry Ford and 
the Dodge brothers over whether the Ford Motor Company, a close 
corporation that Ford controlled, should pay dividends to shareholders in 
light of enormous accumulation of capital surplus and whether the 
company should be permitted to make large capital investments. Ford 
justified his business decisions on his philosophy that a corporation should 
“employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to 
the greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their 
homes.”22 The Michigan Supreme Court rejected this economic philosophy 
and rebuked Ford: “A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are 
to be employed for that end.”23  
For an old case from Michigan dealing with the legal issue of minority 
oppression in a close corporation, Dodge v. Ford has assumed an outsized 
                                                                                                                                     
19  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01(a). Most 
corporate charters track the statute and make no reference to profit maximization. See, e.g., 
Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Facebook, Inc., Art. III (May 22, 2012).  
20  See Elhauge, supra note 5, at 737; D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 279-80, 289 (1998). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0830(3); infra note 139 (citing 
cases where courts reject shareholder primacy on the basis of constituency statutes).  
21  170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
22  Id. at 671. “The true industrial idea is not to make money. The industrial idea is to 
express a serviceable idea, to duplicate a useful idea, by as many thousands as there are 
people who need it.” HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HENRY 
FORD at 92 (1922).  
23  170 N.W. at 684 (emphasis added).  
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prominence in legal scholarship.24 Its celebrity is due to two factors. First, 
Henry Ford and the Ford Motor Company, no less the Dodge brothers, are 
fabled figures in American industry. Second, this history wraps a judicial 
statement of shareholder primacy in crystalline form. This second factor 
gives Dodge v. Ford its prominence in legal scholarship. It is a polestar. There 
has not been another such unconditional general embrace by a state 
supreme court. Despite its prominence as an iconic standard-bearer of 
shareholder primacy, the case has been rarely cited in the past century by 
other jurisdictions.25 In Delaware, it has only been cited three times for 
other propositions.26 In almost one hundred years, only the West Virginia 
Supreme Court has restated Dodge v. Ford’s iconic proposition, but in the 
context of justifying broad authority to engage in corporate philanthropy, a 
                                                                                                                                     
24  See STOUT, supra note 5, at 25 (“oversized effects of a single outdated and widely 
misunderstood judicial opinion”). The case has been cited in 819 law review articles, as of 
November 22, 2016. It is also prominent in the business law curriculum of law schools. See, 
e.g., ROBERT J. RHEE & RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND 
POLICY (9th ed. 2017 forthcoming); CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 270-73 (7th ed. 
2014); M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford: Everything Old Is New Again, in 
CORPORATE LAW STORIES at 37-75 (Mark J. Ramseyer, ed., 2009). 
25  The case is cited in 42 state court opinions as of November 22, 2016. Compare this 
to the 1,144 citations to Meinhard v. Salmon, supra note 18. Of the 23 non-Michigan cases, 
most cite the case for the proposition related to rebutting the business judgment rule to 
compel dividends. Blackwell v. Nixon, 1991 WL 194725, at *4 (Del.Ch. 1991); Alaska 
Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 
of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (Mass. 1975); Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, 
Inc., 163 A.2d 288, 295 (Del. 1960); Gordon v. Elliman, 119 N.E.2d 331, 334 (N.Y. 1954); 
Meadows v. Bradshaw-Diehl Co., 81 S.E.2d 63, 69 (W.Va. 1954); Swinton v. W.J. Bush & 
Co., 102 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup.Ct. 1951); Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, 165 P.2d 779, 789 (Ore. 
1946); Johnson v. Lamprecht, 15 N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ohio 1938); Dodge v. Scripps, 37 P.2d 896, 
902 (Wash. 1934); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 177 N.E. 309, 311 (N.Y. 
1931); Jones v. Van Heusen Charles Co., 246 N.Y.S. 204, 208-09 (App.Div. 1930); Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 537 (Sup.Ct. 1927); Gesell v. Tomahawk Land 
Co., 200 N.W. 550, 556 (Wisc. 1924). Several courts have cited Dodge v. Ford for the 
proposition related to minority oppression by a majority shareholder, or a general 
statement of law regarding bad faith, fraud, or breach of fiduciary duty by a manager. Hill 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 692 (App. 2008); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 
560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (Ore. 1977); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779-80 (Ill.App. 1968); 
Long v. Norwood Hills Corp., 380 S.W.2d 451, 476 (Mo.App. 1964); Rogan v. Oliver, 110 
So.3d 980, 983 (Fla.App.Ct. 2013). Two cases cite Dodge v. Ford for propositions related to 
corporate philanthropy. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 584 (N.J. 1953); E. I. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Clark, 88 A.2d 436, 444 (Del. 1952) (Tunnell, J., dissenting).  
26  See supra note 25.  
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concept that is at least in tension with maximizing shareholder profit.27 
There is another anomalous case. In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, the founders of Craigslist, a website created for users to list 
products and services for sale, adopted a poison pill plan to thwart eBay’s 
attempt to acquire Craigslist.28 Delaware has long legitimized the use of 
poison pills,29 as long as the defensive measure is a reasonable response to 
the threat posed to the corporation under Unocal. 30  The founders of 
Craigslist argued that the poison pill was necessary to protect Craigslist’s 
social values and community-centric corporate culture, which would be 
threatened by the acquisition of the corporate giant eBay.31 The Delaware 
Chancery Court rejected the argument and its reasoning echoed the Dodge 
v. Ford proclamation:  
 
Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe craigslist 
should not be about the business of stockholder wealth 
maximization, now or in the future. . . . Having chosen a for-profit 
corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary 
duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards 
include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the 
benefit of its stockholders. The “Inc.” after the company name has 
to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes 
of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that 
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the 
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit 
of its stockholders . . . . Directors of a for-profit Delaware 
corporation cannot deploy a rights plan to defend a business 
strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth maximization―at 
least not consistently with the directors’ fiduciary duties under 
Delaware law.32 
 
This statement strongly embraces shareholder primacy. It is a trial 
court opinion of a single judge, but still an influential court. If Dodge v. Ford 
is a polestar, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark is a sign of the season, 
a trade wind blowing toward shareholder-centrism.  
The point still stands: case law is scant. In the over one hundred years 
of the modern era of corporations and in light of a well-developed corporate 
law, there does not seem to be a weight of case law establishing a duty on 
                                                                                                                                     
27  See Gilbert v. Northfolk & W. Ry. Co., 171 S.E. 814, 815 (W.Va. 1933).  
28  16 A.3d 1, 15-16 (Del.Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.).  
29  Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).  
30  Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).  
31  16 A.3d at 32.  
32  Id. at 34-35 (emphasis in original).  
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boards to maximize shareholder profit in managing a going concern. In this 
respect, these cases could just as well be characterized as outlier opinions 
rather than crystalline examples of existing principle. In light of the 
disconnection between Dodge v. Ford’s prominence and its actual influence 
on corporate law, some commentators have dismissed the case as largely 
irrelevant.33  
 
B. Conflict with Managerial Authority  
 
Unlike other business entities, corporate law presupposes a manager in 
the form of a board and vests the board with managerial authority.34 A duty 
to maximize profit, subjecting the board’s decision to judicial review, would 
impose a framework of a rule and enforceable sanction (hereinafter “rule‒
sanction”). In the study of jurisprudence, such a law is said to be Austinian 
in the sense of an order backed by the threat of government power.35 It is 
blackletter law that fiduciary duties in corporate law are liability rules; the 
breach of the duties of care and loyalty may result in legal liability for 
various parties subject to the liability scheme.36 The basic tenets of corporate 
law are the separation of ownership and control 37  and the primacy of 
managerial authority.38 As a conceptual matter, a rule‒sanction framework 
of a duty to maximize profit presents an irreconcilable conflict between 
                                                                                                                                     
33  Millon, supra note 5, at 1023; STOUT, supra note 5, at 25-29; Lynn A. Stout, Why We 
Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 168-74 (2008). See Smith, supra 
note 20, at 322 (arguing that due to the business judgment rule “the shareholder primacy 
norm is nearly irrelevant”). But see Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business 
Judgment Rule, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888052 
(arguing that the policy behind the business judgment rule is grounded in shareholder 
wealth maximization).  
34  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.01(a).  
35  See HART, supra note 10, at 16-17 (discussing Austin’s concept of law in JOHN 
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832)). 
36  See, e.g., RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); In re Rural 
Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 110 (Del.Ch. 2014); Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2011); 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Guth v. Loft, 5 A2d 503 
(Del. 1939).  
37  N. Am. Catholic Educ. Prog. Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 
2007); Malone v. Brincat, 722, A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998); Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business 
Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771, 779 (2009).  
38  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.01(a); Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).  
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authority and accountability because profit-seeking is the core managerial 
function in a business corporation.39  
Shareholder primacy is clearly unenforceable on its own term because 
the business judgment rule would defeat any claims based on a failure to 
maximize profit. 40  Corporate managers formulate business strategy. A 
rule‒sanction is antithetical to the core concept of the business judgment 
rule. In over one hundred years of modern corporate law, has a state 
supreme court imposed liability for breach of fiduciary duty on the specific 
ground that the board, in managing operational matters, failed to maximize 
shareholder profit, though it made the decision informedly, disinterestedly, 
and in good faith?41 That case does not exist. In fact, many cases show just 
the opposite. Courts have held that shareholders cannot challenge a board’s 
decision on the specific grounds that, for example: the company paid its 
employees too much;42 it failed to pursue a profit opportunity;43 it did not 
maximize the settlement amount in a negotiation;44  it failed to lawfully 
avoid taxes.45 There are classic textbook cases where courts have rejected 
attempts of shareholders to interfere with the board’s decisions on the 
argument that their views of business or strategy would have maximized 
                                                                                                                                     
39  See Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 604-05 (noting the conflict between authority of 
managers and accountability to shareholders); Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, 
The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals 
Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 522 (1989) (“The power to hold to account is the power to 
interfere and, ultimately, the power to decide.”). See also MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid 
Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (“The most fundamental principles of corporate 
governance are a function of the allocation of power within a corporation between its 
stockholders and its board of directors.”).  
40  STOUT, supra note 5, at 29; Macey, supra note 8, at 180-81; Smith, supra note 20, at 
286; D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 985, 
1002 (2008). See Bratton, supra note 5, at 716 (“A legal mandate to maximize makes no sense 
in a dynamic economy.”). 
41  See Fisch, supra note 5, at 651 (“Although Dodge v. Ford is frequently cited, no 
modern court has struck down an operational decision on the ground that it favors 
stakeholder interests over shareholder interests.”).  
42  See, e.g., In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104 
(Del.Ch. 2014); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).   
43  See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill.App. 1968). 
44  See, e.g., Carlton Investments v. TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., 1997 WL 305829 
(Del.Ch. 1997).  
45  See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App.Div. 1976). 
Taxpayers have a right to pursue lawful tax avoidance strategies. Gregory v. Helvering, 
293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). Yet, there is no duty under corporate law to lawfully avoid tax. See 
Freedman v. Adams, 2012 WL 1345638, at *13 (Del.Ch. 2012); Seinfeld v. Slager, 2012 WL 
2501105, at *3 (Del.Ch. 2012).  
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shareholder value.46  
A rule‒sanction would be difficult and inefficient to implement 
through a liability rule. Commanding a board to maximize profit upon 
threat of sanction does not shed light on how it should do so. Such a 
command is different from instructing a person not to drive negligently. 
Profit is a score, not a strategy. An indeterminate set of potential business 
strategies, each subject to unique business risk, must be reviewed and 
second-guessed through the litigation system.47  In concrete terms, there 
may be no way to tell how profits can be maximized for the New York 
Times as between two strategies: firing a number of reporters and thereby 
cutting employee costs, or hiring more and thereby increasing costs. The 
former could be characterized as a financial strategy based on the 
company’s margin structure; the latter could be a strategy based on 
producing the highest quality product. A specific corporate action may be 
motivated by profit maximization, but it is not a deterministic end of such 
motive. The profit motive may result in stochastic corporate actions.48 
If there is an enforceable duty, courts will struggle over the proper 
allocation of authority and accountability for business actions and profits. 
Any new division between deference and judicial review would require 
some judicial determination of whether profit has been maximized. 
Foundational rules of corporate law, such as the separation of ownership 
and control and the business judgment rule, would be tested in a conceptual 
shift. This conflict would ultimately be inefficient and incoherent.  
Neither Dodge v. Ford nor eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 
conflicts with this analysis. In both cases, the specific holdings did not rest 
on or establishes an independent fiduciary duty to maximize profit, 
enforceable by sanctions. The holding in Dodge rested on an abuse of 
discretion in Ford’s dividend decision in the context of a minority freeze 
                                                                                                                                     
46  See, e.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App.Div. 1976); 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill.App. 1968).  
47  See E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporate Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate 
Governance Practice―or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184-85 (2001); In re Pure 
Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. 808 A.2d 421, 434-35 (Del.Ch. 2002).  
48  See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 245 (2002) (“[V]alue maximizing says nothing 
about how to create a superior vision or strategy.”); Roe, supra note 52, at 2072 (noting that 
corporate law's instructions to managers to enhance shareholder profit do not “determine 
what they do”).  
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out.49 The holding in eBay rested on the court’s application of the Unocal 
enhanced standard of review applicable to corporate defensive measures.50 
As a doctrinal matter, neither case can fairly be read to establish a 
cognizable duty to maximize profit, though clearly the admitted failure to 
maximize profit by the controlling shareholders in both cases was a 
significant, if not dispositive, factor in the holdings that rested on other 
doctrines of corporate law.  
 
C. Academic Discourse and Consensus 
 
In light of the seemingly scant law and the doctrinal problem of a rule‒
sanction framework, academic discourse on shareholder primacy has 
revolved around theoretical and policy arguments (after the usually 
obligatory discussion of Dodge v. Ford).51 Legal scholarship almost always 
describes shareholder primacy as a social norm. 52  This descriptive is 
significant because a norm is generally not considered law and is not subject 
to legal sanction. 53  The unclear legal status of shareholder primacy is 
evident in academic discourse.  
In an influential essay, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman argue 
that as an observed matter corporate law has reached an ultimate 
consensus: “The point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic 
and experience, there is convergence on a consensus that the best means to 
this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate 
managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in 
                                                                                                                                     
49  170 N.W. 668, 682-85 (Mich. 1919). Several scholars have correctly noted that the 
holding relates specifically to minority oppression by withholding dividends. Smith, supra 
note 20, at 315; STOUT, supra note 5, at 26-27.  
50  16 A.3d 1, 28-35 (Del.Ch. 2010).  
51  The rise of shareholder primacy as an idea has been well described in legal 
scholarship. See STOUT, supra note 5, at 18-19; Millon, supra note 7, at 1025-34; Fisch, supra 
note 5, at 656-61. In brief, shareholder primacy arose from theoretical work by economists 
in the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in subsequent law and economic conception of corporate 
law. See, e.g., Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 
(1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & 
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1996).  
52  A Westlaw search of the terms “shareholder primacy norm” and “shareholder 
wealth maximization norm” shows that a total of 618 articles used one of the two terms as 
of November 22, 2016.  See, e.g., James D. Nelson, The Freedom of Business Association, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 461, 502 (2015); Bratton, supra note 5, at 720; Fisch, supra note 5, at 637; 
Bainbridge, supra note 38, at 573; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, 465-66 n.41; Mark 
J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 2063, 2064 (2001); Smith, supra note 20, at 277.  
53  See infra notes 190-192 and accompanying text.  
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direct terms, only to those interests.”54 This “standard” model reflects an 
internalization of shareholder-centric ideology by a broad consensus of 
business, government, and legal elites. 55  Absent in the analysis was 
discussion of law and its relationship to observed internalization of 
shareholder primacy.56  
In an article specifically analyzing Dodge v. Ford, Jonathan Macey 
argues that the case has “legal effect” and is a “positive account of what 
corporate law actually is,”57 but has also noted the limited evidence of law 
in the form of a rule‒sanction. He explains that the reason we rarely see case 
like Dodge v. Ford is because managers are better coached and are more 
willing to dissemble than Ford was to get the benefit the business judgment 
deference. 58  Shareholder primacy is “the law on the books, if not in 
practice.”59 The concept is like a street sign that clearly posts a speed limit, 
but the actual norm is to drive faster than the posted sign. The problem is 
not the lack of clarity of the rule, but the lack of enforceability of the rule.60 
Shareholder primacy is unenforceable because managers can hide behind 
the business judgment rule as long as they do not reveal their motive as 
Ford had done.61 Thus, on the one hand profit maximization “actually is” 
corporate law, but at the same time Macy calls it a “norm.”62  
In a recent essay, Leo Strine, the chief justice of the Delaware Supreme 
Court, defends shareholder primacy from a normative perspective.63 This 
essay is notable in two respects. First, invoking Milton Friedman’s famous 
                                                                                                                                     
54  Hansmann & Kraakman, note 6, at 441.  
55  Id. at 439. See Nelson, supra note 52, at 501-02 (“widely accepted social norm among 
business leaders”); STOUT, supra note 5, at 4 (“accepted as a truth” by business and policy 
elites); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary 
Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 & n.35 (2002) (“most corporate law scholars embrace 
some variant of shareholder primacy”); Smith, supra note 20, at 278 (fully internalized by 
managers); Fisch, supra note 5, at 640 (“overwhelmingly embraced” by scholars). See also 
Edwards v. Morrow, 725 S.E.2d 366 (N.C.App. 2012) (“From an economics standpoint, it is 
considered a given that the primary aim of a for-profit entity is profit maximization.”).  
56  The article cited no primary legal authority, except a minor citation to Weinberger 
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Id. at 456 n.28.  
57  Macey, supra note 8, at 178, 180.  
58  Id. at 180.  
59  Id. at 181.  
60  Id.  
61  See supra notes 33, 40 & 41.  
62  Id. at 179. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 
1319, 1342 (calling it both “law” and “norm”).  
63  Strine, supra note 4.  
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manifesto on profit maximization, 64  Strine states that “corporate law 
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith 
strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”65 Linking shareholder 
wealth maximization to the duty of loyalty is a serious matter in the practice 
of corporate law because money damages against a director for a breach 
cannot be exculpated. 66  With that said, Strine caveats his statement by 
reciting the primacy of managerial authority: “The directors, of course, 
retain substantial discretion, outside the context of a change of control, to 
decide how best to achieve that goal and the appropriate time frame for 
delivering those returns.”67 This comment acknowledges the incoherence 
of subjecting managerial authority to a rule‒sanction for the failure to 
maximize profit.68 Second, like Hansmann and Kraakman’s earlier essay, 
Strine’s essay is notable in that he does not make a sustained legal argument 
for shareholder primacy. He cites and discusses Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. 
Newmark, but this discussion punctuates a largely policy-laden argument 
supported by academic literature on shareholder primacy.69  
Lastly, the contestability of the legal status of shareholder primacy is 
evident in a recent New York Time opinion editorial debate between Lynn 
Stout and Stephen Bainbridge, two eminent scholars of corporate law. Stout 
argues that corporate law does not mandate a legal duty to maximize 
profit.70 But Bainbridge argues that shareholder primacy has been the law 
since Dodge v. Ford. 71  On the basic question of defining the law, their 
positions at first glance seem contradictory.  
The above review of literature is not a criticism, but simply confirms 
the earlier observation that pinpointing the law of shareholder primacy has 
been elusive. Without a positive legal theory, the academic discourse does 
not rely on the law so much as it defaults to normative arguments to suggest 
                                                                                                                                     
64  See supra note 4.  
65  Strine, supra note 4, at 155, 171. Strine further echoes Milton Friedman when he 
suggests that profit maximization promotes “the public interest.” Id. at 135-36.  
66  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
67  Strine, supra note 4, at 155.  
68  Delaware jurists have suggested that shareholder primacy is “a matter of principle,” 
but stopped short of calling it law. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The 
Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 
1079 (2002). 
69  See Strine, supra note 4, at 145-55.  
70  Lynn Stout writes: “There is a common belief that corporate directors have a legal 
duty to maximize corporate profits and ‘shareholder value’―even if this means skirting 
ethical rules, damaging the environment or harming employees. But this belief is utterly 
false.” Lynn Stout, Corporations Don’t Have to Maximize Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015).  
71  Stephen Bainbridge writes: “Despite contrary claims by some academics and 
Occupy Wall Street-type partisans, this [Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.] remains the law today.” 
Stephen Bainbridge, A Duty to Shareholder Value, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015). 
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what law or corporate governance norm is or should be. The implicit 
assumption is that the suasion of normative theory, manifesting in a social 
norm, is the root cause of managerial internalization and behavior.  
Even today, the legal status of a fundamental concept of corporate law 
is uncertain and contestable. The legal theory advanced in this article show 
that both Stout and Bainbridge, and other commentators, are correct in their 
precise positions: shareholder primacy is not a duty, but it is law; it is 
broadly obeyed and thus efficacious, but it is unenforceable. Advocates and 
critics of shareholder primacy are not as far apart as they seem to be. The 
apparent conflict in their positions is grounded in two factors: first, an 
incompleteness of the concept of law resulting in an implicit assumption 
that the law must take the form of an independent fiduciary duty; second, 
an underappreciation of the role of courts in recognizing and advancing a 
legal obligation. A coherent legal theory can bridge the apparent divide in 
conflicting positions and our understanding of the most important rule of 
corporation law as it has come to be developed by courts.  
 
II.   PARTIAL SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
 
Shareholder primacy does not exist as a single locus rule‒sanction, but 
instead weaves through a series of rules of corporate law and the 
architecture of the corporate and market systems. Corporate law partially 
achieves the end of shareholder primacy through three discrete pathways. 
First, in realm of corporate finance, when there is an inter-security conflict 
of interest among capital providers involving common stock, corporate law 
mandates that the value of common stock must be maximized over other 
securities. Second, in the realm of takeovers, corporate law imposes a duty 
to maximize common stock value when the corporation is selling control. 
Third, in the vast realm of day-to-day managerial decisionmaking in a 
going concern, there is not a single locus, easily identifiable rule of law that 
mandates profit maximization, but the corporate and market systems, 
constructed through the legal system, steer managers toward the end of 
shareholder primacy even when corporate law empowers the primacy of 
managerial authority.  
 
A. Inter-Security Priority 
 
Shareholder primacy is clearly evident in the realm of corporate 
finance. Among securityholders, common stockholders are owed fiduciary 
duty and are preferred over other securityholders. Although the variety of 
securities a corporation can issue is limited only by the freedom of contract, 
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there are three principal classes of securities: debt, preferred stock, and 
common stock. These financial instruments often present inter-security 
conflicts among securityholders.  
Consider the relative positions of creditors and common stockholders. 
The interests of creditors and shareholders can conflict because managers, 
in the pursuit of shareholder wealth, can make decisions that externalize 
risk to creditors, a form of opportunism that enriches shareholders at the 
cost of creditors.72 Although corporate law provides some protection to 
creditors,73 the creditor’s principal protection is the ability to negotiate for 
the terms of credit through contract law.74 Outside of insolvency, creditors 
are not owed fiduciary duty,75 but of course common stockholders are.76 
This makes economic sense since creditors have priority rights to corporate 
income and assets and thus take less financial risk than common 
stockholders.77  
The primacy of shareholders over creditors is seen in several doctrines. 
Creditors invoke the doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing when the issuer corporation takes an action that benefits 
shareholders at their expense and there are no express contractual 
protections in the credit contract. Courts have limited the application of this 
contract doctrine, essentially rejecting an independent cause of action for 
bad faith action against creditors. Absent an identifiable connection to a 
bargained for term in the contract, courts generally reject these claims.78  
A more direct example illustrating the primacy of common stock over 
                                                                                                                                     
72  See generally Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013).  
73  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a); MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.40(j); Klang v Smith's 
Food & Drug Centers, Inc. 702 A.2d 150 (Del. 1997).  
74  AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES at 2 (1971); Mann v. 
Oppenheimer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056, 1061 (Del. 1986); Production Res. Group v. NCT Group, 
Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 (Del.Ch. 2004). 
75  N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla 930 A.2d 92, 99, 
101-02 (Del. 2007); Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988); Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 
508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986). See Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988) (no 
duty to convertible bondholders). 
76  Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).  
77  See RICHARD BREALEY, STEWART MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 493 n.12 (11th ed. 2013).  
78  See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.Supp. 1504, 
1520 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The sort of unbounded and one-sided elasticity urged by plaintiffs 
would interfere with and destabilize the market.”); Winshall v. Viacom Intern., Inc., 76 
A.3d 808, 816 (Del. 2013) (“Rather, a party may only invoke the protections of the covenant 
when it is clear from the underlying contract that the contracting parties would have 
agreed to proscribe the act later complained of . . . had they thought to negotiate with 
respect to that matter.”). 
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debt is seen in a seminal Delaware case on coercion and exit consents. In 
Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., bondholders objected to a coercive exchange offer 
that was conditioned on the tendering bondholders providing the company 
exit consents to amend the indenture. 79  The corporation extended the 
exchange offer as a part of a restructuring, which required removing 
protections that hindered the restructuring. The complaining bondholders 
argued that the exchange offer was coercive and that the amendment was 
designed to strip nontendering bondholders of their protective covenants. 
They averred that “the purpose and effect of the Exchange Offers is to 
benefit Oak’s common stockholders at the expense of the Holders of its 
debt.”80 The court held that the exchange offer was in fact coercive, but not 
wrongfully so.81   
 
It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the 
long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders; that they may 
sometimes do so “at the expense” of others (even assuming that a 
transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully 
be said to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a 
breach of duty. It seems likely that corporate restructurings designed to 
maximize shareholder values may in some instances have the effect of 
requiring bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect 
transfer economic value from bondholders to stockholders.82 
 
The issuing corporation must respect the legal duties to creditors under 
contract law, but otherwise the board has a duty to prefer the interest of 
shareholders over creditors. When a board benefits common stockholders 
through the intentional infliction of economic loss on creditors (e.g., 
through risk shifting in Katz), absent an impairment of capital or fraudulent 
conveyance, the board and the corporation act pursuant to the duty to 
shareholders.  
Consider next the relative positions among preferred stockholders and 
common stockholders. The priority of interest is more nuanced since both 
are stockholders, but ultimately Delaware law has evolved to prefer clearly 
the interest of common stockholders over that of preferred stockholders.  
At common law, unless preferences are found in the certificate of 
                                                                                                                                     
79  508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986). 
80  Id. at 879.  
81  Id. at 880-82.  
82  Id. at 879 (emphasis added).  
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incorporation, all shares of stock are equal and thus court do not recognize 
a preference in forms of stock.83 Contractual preferences provide preferred 
stockholders benefits and also limitations. The typical preferences are 
priorities over dividend and liquidation and a limitation on participation 
beyond the fixed dividend.84 When the right asserted is not a preference, 
fiduciary duties are owed to preferred stockholders as well.85 Delaware 
cases followed this common law rule.86 However, Delaware has steadily 
undermined the rule of equality. 
In the 1990s, Delaware law evolved in favor of common stockholders. 
Rather than viewing preferred stock as a form of stock with contractually 
negotiated preferences but otherwise standing in equal dignity to common 
stock, Delaware courts emphasized the contractual nature of preferred 
stock, thus treating preferred stock more like debt than common stock.87  
In Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, preferred stockholders (early 
venture capital investors in a struggling public company) desired to 
liquidate the company and common stockholders sought to continue the 
enterprise by seeking new capital funding.88 In light of Delaware’s evident 
policy preference in favor of business decisions promoting the continuation 
of a going concern,89 the court’s ruling in favor of common stockholders is 
not so remarkable. However, the justification for its ruling is revealing:  
 
                                                                                                                                     
83  Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del.Ch. 1986); Shanghai 
Power Co. v. Delaware Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589, 593 (Del.Ch. 1974), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
by Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624 (Del. 1977). See MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, 
2010 WL 1782271, at *6 (Del.Ch. 2010) (“I begin with the proposition that all stock is created 
equal. By this I mean that all classes of stock enjoy the same rights and privileges unless an 
affirmative expression alters those rights.”).  
84  ROBERT J. RHEE, CORPORATE FINANCE at 312-13 (2016).  
85  See Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del.Ch. 1986) (stating 
that where there is no stated preference “the existence of such right and the scope of the 
correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal standards”). See also MCG 
Capital Corp. v. Maginn, 2010 WL 1782271, at *6 (Del.Ch. 2010) (holding that preferred 
stockholders have standing to bring derivative actions).  
86  See, e.g., Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831 (Del.Ch. 1997); In re FLS Holdings Inc. 
S’holder Litig., 1993 WL 104562 (Del.Ch. 1993); Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 
A.2d 1051 (Del.Ch. 1987); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del.Ch. 1986); 
Dalton v. American Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574 (Del.Ch. 1985).  
87  Preferred stock is a hybrid instrument that has the features of both debt and equity. 
See RHEE, supra note 84, at 311-12. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, Preferred Stock―Law 
and Draftsmanship, 42 CAL. L. REV. 243 (1954). 
88  705 A.2d 1040 (Del.Ch. 1997).  
89  See, e.g., Orban v. Field, 1997 WL 153831 (Del.Ch. 1997); Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991 WL 277613 (Del.Ch. 1991); Katz v. 
Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986).  
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While the facts out of which this dispute arises indisputably entail the 
imposition by the board of (or continuation of) economic risks upon 
the preferred stock which the holders of the preferred did not want, 
and while this board action was taken for the benefit largely of the 
common stock, those facts do not constitute a breach of duty. . . . The 
special protections offered to the preferred are contractual in nature. 
The corporation is, of course, required to respect those legal rights. 
But, aside from the insolvency point just alluded to, generally it will 
be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to 
prefer the interests of common stock . . . to the interests . . . of preferred stock, 
where there is a conflict. See Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc.90  
 
This passage departs from the traditional understanding under 
common law that, if a preference is not stated, stocks are considered equal.91 
Under Equity-Linked Investors, absent a special preference in the corporate 
contract, the interest of common stockholders may be elevated over the 
interest of preferred stockholders. Furthermore, by citing Katz v. Oak 
Industries as authority and analogizing the permissibility of transferring 
risk from common stockholders to other securityholders, the court pushes 
the analysis of preferred stock toward the same analytical framework 
applicable to credit contracts.  
Several recent cases in Delaware have further strengthened the hand of 
common stockholders. In In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, the board 
pursued a merger in which virtually all of the merger consideration would 
go the preferred stockholders due to the triggering of a liquidation 
preference.92 Common stockholders got nothing. A common stockholder 
averred in the complaint that the board, comprised mostly of directors 
elected by preferred stockholders, breached its fiduciary duty to them. The 
court noted: “in circumstances where the interests of the common 
stockholders diverge from those of the preferred stockholders, it is possible 
that a director could breach her duty by improperly favoring the interests 
of the preferred stockholders over those of the common stockholders.”93 
The court set forth a principle that, unless a preference is expressly 
                                                                                                                                     
90  Equity-Linked, 705 A.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).  
91  “At common law and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary all shares of 
stock are equal. . . . [W]here however the right asserted is not to a preference as against the 
common stock but rather a right shared equally with the common, the existence of such 
right and the scope of the correlative duty may be measured by equitable as well as legal 
standards.” Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 593-94 (Del.Ch. 1986).  
92  2009 WL 2225958 (Del.Ch. 2009).  
93  Id. at *7.  
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provided in the corporate contract, where the interests of preferred and 
common stockholders conflict the latter’s interest is preferred. 94  This 
proposition―stated in both Equity-Linked and Trados―turns the original rule 
in common law upside down, because under traditional common law all 
stocks are treated equally unless there is a stated preference right or 
limitation therefrom.  
In LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, the issue again involved the 
allocation of merger consideration between convertible preferred and 
common stockholders.95 The certificate did not set a contractual merger 
price to be paid to the preferred stockholders. The preferred stockholders 
argued that the fair allocation should exceed the “as converted” value of 
their stock due to the unique features of the stock and the circumstance of 
the preferred stockholders.96 The court rejected this argument, reasoning 
that the contractual right of conversion determines the duty owed by the 
board to the preferred stockholders. In this case, the board “was entitled to 
favor the interests of the common stockholders.”97 The court acknowledged 
that recent decisions discussing fiduciary duties to preferred stockholders 
conflict with earlier cases.98 The court attempted to harmonize the conflict. 
When the rights of the preferred are found in the contract, the board must 
                                                                                                                                     
94  In subsequent proceeding, the chancery court ultimately held that, under the entire 
fairness standard, the merger consideration to the common stockholder was fair. In re 
Trados Shareholder Litigation, 73 A.3d 17 (Del.Ch. 2013). The court emphasized in the 
analysis:  
 
To reiterate, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive 
in good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the firm's value, not for the benefit of its contractual 
claimants. In light of this obligation, “it is the duty of directors to pursue 
the best interests of the corporation and its common stockholders, if that 
can be done faithfully with the contractual promises owed to the 
preferred.”  
 
Id. at 41-42 (quoting LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del.Ch. 
2010)).  
95  990 A.2d 435 (Del.Ch. 2010).  
96  Previously, Delaware courts have considered the unique features of the preferred 
stock and the circumstance of their holders when considering the fairness of the merger 
consideration. See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del.Ch. 1986); In 
re FLS Holdings Inc. S’holder Litig., 1993 WL 104562 (Del.Ch. 1993).  
97  LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 438.  
98  Id. at 446-47 (citing apparent tension in recent cases such as In re Trados Inc. S’holder 
Litig., 2009 WL 2225958 (Del.Ch. 2009), with older cases such as Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, 
Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del.Ch. 1986) and In re FLS Holdings Inc. S’holder Litig., 1993 WL 104562 
(Del.Ch. 1993)).  
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honor them, but it does not owe any further “unspecified fiduciary 
beneficence on the preferred at the expense of the common.” 99  When, 
however, there is no contractual basis for treatment of the preferred, the 
board must engage in gap-filling and attempt to fairly reconcile the 
competing interests of the common and preferred. Echoing Equity-Linked 
and Trados, the court endorsed the rule “that it is the duty of directors to 
pursue the best interests of the corporation and its common stockholders, if 
that can be done faithfully with the contractual promises owed to the 
preferred.”100 
In an insightful article, William Bratton and Michael Wachter observe 
that preferred stock is subject to the tug and pull of conflicting analytical 
paradigms of corporate law and contract law.101 Courts sometimes invoke 
the contract principle and at other times the corporate law prism, and they 
seemingly do this without a coherent theory. 102  Bratton and Wachter 
conclude that any apparent inconsistency is dispelled by judicial outcome 
preference (“the preferred always lose”): “Still, we are left with corporate 
treatment when corporate treatment benefits the common and contract 
treatment when contract treatment benefits the common.” 103  Why the 
outcome preference? They answer that Delaware courts ultimately are 
driven by the “common stock-value maximization norm.”104 This article 
agrees with their cogent analysis and conclusion. In the realm of 
stockholder class conflicts, corporate law mandates a priority duty to 
common stockholders. The opinions in Equity-Linked, Trados and LC Capital 
clearly state this.  
The law of corporate finance shows that, in the absence of bargained 
for contractual protections, there is a clear preference for the interest of 
common shareholders over other capital providers. This observation is now 
trivially obvious with respect to creditors. Corporate law has also recently 
                                                                                                                                     
99  LC Capital, 990 A.2d at 448-49 (relying on HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott 
Corp., 1993 WL 205040 (Del.Ch. 1993)).  
100  Id. at 452. The trend toward protection of common stockholders has continued. See 
Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Technologies, Inc., 65 A.3d 618 (Del.Ch. 2013).  
101  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 1815, 1821, 1900-01 (2013). 
102  Id. at 1901.  
103  Id. at 1901, 1902. But see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Response: Poor Pitiful or Potentially Powerful 
Preferred?, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 2025 (2013). 
104  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 101, at 1816, 1823, 1824, 1877, 1882, 1905. “The 
court's disposition to favor the common is unsurprising: Delaware sells a product, the 
buyers of which tend to be holders of common stock or their management representatives.” 
Id. at 1901.   
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treated preferred stock more like debt by emphasizing contractual rights 
and less like stock. This trend has left common stock as the clearly preferred 
securityholder among capital providers. The law mandates that boards 
must maximize the wealth of common stockholders.  
 
B. Revlon Duty 
 
In the takeover realm, a board ordinarily has significant control of 
decisions.105 This discretion may include consideration of “the impact on 
‘constituencies’ other than shareholder (i.e., creditors, customers, 
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).” 106  However, 
under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., a board has a duty 
to maximize shareholder profit once the object is no longer “to protect or 
maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.”107 The 
director’s role changes from “defenders of the corporate bastion to 
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale 
of the company.”108 In other words, once the board no longer has a future 
duty to manage the business, its present duty is to maximize value for 
shareholders.  
Beyond an all cash sale of the target, 109 there are three scenarios when 
Revlon applies: (1) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process 
for sale or breakup of the company; (2) when a target abandons its longterm 
strategy and acquiesces to a sale of the company to bidder; (3) when a 
                                                                                                                                     
105  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORD. L. REV. 3277, 
3286 (2013); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (2002).  
106  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). See Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[A]bsent a limited set 
of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to 
act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in 
the short term, even in the context of a takeover”).  
107  506 A.2d 173, 192 (Del. 1986). The Revlon duty is not a separate duty independent 
of the duty of care and loyalty, but “application in a specific context of the board's fiduciary 
duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.” RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 
858 (Del. 2015).  
108  Id. at 182. See McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1032 (Del.Ch. 2004); Equity–
Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1054–55 (Del.Ch.1997).  
109  Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1058 (Del.Ch. 1997). An all 
cash deal is not a precondition to triggering Revlon. See, e.g., C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. 
City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, 107 A.3d 
1049 (Del. 2014) (assuming without deciding that a transaction involving a share exchange 
in which acquirer shareholders owned 53% and target shareholders 47% of the post-merger 
company triggered Revlon); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del.Ch. 1999) 
(triggering Revlon in a mixed cash and stock consideration deal).  
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transaction results in a change of control.110 These situations are contextual, 
and scholars have debated the scope of the Revlon duty.111  The precise 
contours of Revlon duty is not within the scope of this article. The relevance 
of Revlon here is that in a specific transaction zone, Revlon provides a rule‒
sanction framework that mandates shareholder wealth maximization. A 
decision in the takeover arena is not an ordinary decision. In a change of 
control of the company, it is the terminal decision. In the Revlon zone, a 
board’s final duty is to maximize shareholder profit.  
Although Revlon is an enforceable rule, it also illustrates the tension 
between the enforcement of shareholder primacy and the law of managerial 
authority. Courts do not provide a judicial blueprint for boards to follow.112 
The application of Revlon to a transaction and board conduct is not 
algorithmic. “No court can tell directors exactly how to accomplish that 
goal, because they will be facing a unique combination of circumstances, 
many of which will be outside their control.”113 Instead, Revlon imposes a 
heightened judicial scrutiny for reasonableness under which “directors are 
generally free to select the path to value maximization.”114 Thus, Revlon 
imposes a rule‒sanction framework, but courts still accept, with a watchful 
eye, the primacy of managerial authority as a pragmatic constraint on the 
assessment of breach and liability.  
                                                                                                                                     
110  Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1989-90 (Del. 1994).  
111  See Stout, supra note 33, at 172 (“The case has become nearly a dead letter.”); Millon, 
supra note 5, at 1035 (“The Revlon duty . . . arises only in a narrow range of 
circumstances . . . .”); Bainbridge, supra note 105, at 3337-38 (providing three circumstances 
in which Revlon duty is triggered); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 172 (2014) (characterizing Revlon as a “narrow, silo-like 
doctrinal isolation”); Mohsen Manesh, Defining by Dictum: The Geography of Revlon-Land in 
Cash and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014) (“The boundaries of 
Revlon-land have never been clearly defined precisely . . . .”); Fisch, supra note 5, at 651 
(“The Revlon decision . . . applies to an extremely small set of cases.”); Bruner, supra note 
52, at 531 (suggesting that the Revlon duty “is in fact quite limited”).  
112  Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.1989); C & J Energy 
Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees' and Sanitation Employees' Retirement 
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014). See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 
A.2d 1361, 1374 (Del.1995) (“[E]nhanced judicial scrutiny mandated ... is not intended to 
lead to a structured, mechanistic, mathematical exercise ... [it is] a flexible paradigm that 
jurists can apply to the myriad of ‘fact scenarios' that confront corporate boards.”). 
113  Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009). 
114  In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595–96 (Del.Ch. 2010). See In re 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000 (Del.Ch. 2005) (“[T]he enhanced 
judicial review Revlon requires is not a license for law-trained courts to second-guess 
reasonable, but debatable, tactical choices that directors have made in good faith.”).  
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C. Market and Architecture 
 
The duties associated with inter-security conflicts and takeovers under 
Revlon are specific transactional situations. The vast majority of managerial 
decisions in the day-to-day management of a going concern are not subject 
to a rule‒sanction framework. 115  Board decisions are protected by the 
business judgment rule. If a board determines that the corporation should 
pay its employees above market wages or incur exceptional cost to surpass 
regulatory compliance standards on the reason that it would be in “the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders,”116 this incantation would 
cloak the board in the shield of the business judgment rule. It would not 
matter that a plaintiff can demonstrate the merit or demerit of the business 
decision from a financial viewpoint.117  
In theory, the law does not seem to hold managers accountable for not 
pursuing the end of shareholder primacy. Commentators have argued that 
shareholder primacy is irrelevant in actual business management.118 The 
point is correct insofar as a corporate manager has broad authority so long 
as it acts informedly, disinterestedly, and in good faith.119  Any rational 
decision can be justified on some abstract benefit to the long-run interest of 
the corporation and shareholders. However, the logical end of expansive 
managerial authority does not necessarily diminish shareholder primacy to 
a social norm of the business community.  
                                                                                                                                     
115  See supra Section I.B.  
116  See Rhee, supra note 5, at 699 (“[W]ith the incantation of ‘long-term interest of the 
corporation and shareholders,’ the threat of liability is whisked away by the spirit of 
plausible good faith.”). See also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 
1287 (Del. 1989); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006); 
Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 
91, 103 n.30 (Del. 2006); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.1993); King 
v. VeriFone Holdings, Inc.,  12 A.3d 1140, 1151 (Del. 2011); Unitrin, Inc. v. American 
General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 n.10 (Del. 1995); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 
A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).  
117  The fiduciary duty of care in corporate law is an artful concept, under which 
substantively poor actions are not a breach of care. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 
264 (Del. 2000) (“Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”); In re 
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[A] decision 
substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious' or 
‘irrational,’ provides no ground for director liability”). See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Tort 
Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139 (2013).  
118  See supra notes 33, 40, 41 & 49 and accompanying text.  
119  See STOUT, supra note 5, at 31 (“The business judgment rule thus allows directors 
in public corporations . . . a remarkably wide range of autonomy in deciding what to do 
with the corporation’s earnings and assets.”). 
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The legal system has conceived a better way of achieving the end of 
shareholder primacy without the complexity and cost of a rule‒sanction 
framework. Let’s assume for argument sake that shareholder primacy is the 
desired policy end (a contestable normative proposition). Corporate law is 
founded on the principle of the separation of ownership and control and 
the primacy of managerial authority. How can the law influence managerial 
behavior toward the end of shareholder primacy?  
Lawrence Lessig provides a helpful way to think about the general 
problem of affecting behavior toward a desired outcome.120 He suggests 
that behavior can be regulated by four mechanisms: (1) law in the Austinian 
sense of a rule backed by the threat of government; (2) social norms through 
non-legal community enforcement; (3) markets through the device of price; 
(4) architecture, which he defines as any feature of the world as it is found 
or made.121 These four mechanisms affecting behavior are not independent. 
The law can affect the efficacy of each of the other mechanisms.122  
 
 
 
For example, the social norm against smoking can be influenced by 
laws against cigarette advertisement and designation of cordoned smoking 
spaces. The market for insurance can be used to incentivize seat belt use 
through subsidization of insurance rates for safe behavior. The architecture 
of discrimination against the physically handicapped can be diminished by 
building codes that mandate accessibility. Thus, the law can influence the 
efficacy of other mechanisms.  
This model provides a helpful framework for understanding how 
corporate law influences managerial behavior toward shareholder primacy. 
                                                                                                                                     
120  Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUDIES 661 (1998). 
121  Id. at 662-63.  
122  Id. at 667-69.  
Figure 1:  Law and Mechanisms Inducing Behavior
BehaviorMarket Norm
Architecture
Law
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The unstated assumption in labeling shareholder primacy as a “norm” is 
that a law of shareholder primacy must be in Austinian form, such as 
fiduciary duty. Because shareholder primacy cannot be in such form 
without irreconcilable conflict with managerial authority, it is reduced to 
the mechanism of norms. This belief is incorrect.  
By calling shareholder primacy a norm, we are simply stating the 
observation that managerial behavior is consistent with shareholder wealth 
maximization. In other words, something is influencing observed behavior, 
and since a legal duty does not exist, we assume, erroneously, that the cause 
must be a social norm. The principal cause of inducing conforming 
behavior is not through the mechanism of a norm, but instead through the 
mechanisms of law, market and architecture (the latter two being enabled 
and influenced by law and the legal system writ large). The workings of 
these three mechanisms, then, legitimize and reinforce an existing norm of 
the business community.123  
With respect to the architecture of markets, shareholder primacy tends 
to be more robust when product competition in the market is strong, as is 
the case of American markets.124 An efficient market limits the agency cost 
of broad managerial control because stock prices would incorporate such 
cost into valuation. When corporations operate within a liquid capital 
market, two forms of direct incentives influence managers. The legal system 
writ large creates a market for corporate control, and it incentivizes 
executive pay that is substantially linked to share price.  
First, the market for corporate control provides the incentive to increase 
and maintain share price.125 The laws relating to mergers and acquisitions 
advance shareholder primacy and directly affect board and managerial 
incentives and conduct. In a liquid capital market, share price is directly 
related to shareholder profit maximization. To avoid an unsolicited 
takeover, managers are incentivized to maximize share price. The pricing 
mechanism of the market, a feature of architecture supported by law, 
enforces shareholder primacy.126 
Second, executive compensation has moved toward a “pay-for-
                                                                                                                                     
123  See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907 (1996) 
(suggesting that “government deserves to have, and in any case inevitably does have, a 
large role in norm management”); Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 1, 38-42 (2001) (explaining ways in which the government affects norms).  
124  Roe, supra note 52, at 2063.  
125  See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110 (1965).  
126  “Hostile takeovers were, and despite the rise of the poison pill still are, an engine 
of shareholder wealth maximization.” Roe, supra note 52, at 2074.  
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performance” model that is linked to share price.127 The state of executive 
compensation today has been influenced by law.128 The current incentive 
system is linked to shareholder wealth. The phenomenal rise of executive 
compensation over the past several decades corresponds temporally to the 
rise of shareholder primacy.129  As flawed as it currently is,130  executive 
compensation is a pricing mechanism for managerial talent and outcomes. 
The law and the legal system link the stock value of shareholders and the 
architecture of the corporate system and capital markets. These linkages 
clearly affect managerial incentive to maximize profit.131  
If shareholder primacy is only a consensus among managers, 
shareholders, and academics and subject only to community reprobation, 
then the most accurate description would fit the definition of a norm. 
However, the market and the architecture of the corporate system constrain 
the otherwise expansive legal discretion afforded to corporate managers 
and steer, partially at least, managerial decisions toward the end of 
shareholder wealth maximization.132  
                                                                                                                                     
127  See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentive―It's Not How Much You 
Pay, But How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990).  
128  The tax code incentivizes pay-for-performance. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (limiting 
deductibility of executive compensation to $1 million unless it is a qualified performance-
based compensation). Absent a breach of duty, corporate law does not review the amount 
of compensation awarded. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 
27 (Del. 2006); In re The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104 
(Del.Ch. 2014). 
129  Compare infra Section III.B and Charts 2 and 3 (showing rise of shareholder primacy 
in courts since the 1980s), with Robert J. Rhee, Intrafirm Monitoring of Executive Compensation, 
69 VAND. L. REV. 695 (2016) (showing rise of executive compensation since the 1980s). See 
also Rock, supra 72, at 1917 (“The biggest development since the 1980s is that CEOs now 
have large amounts of equity and equity-linked compensation.”).  
130  A legion of scholarship has been critical of executive compensation based on either 
the amount of compensation paid or the decoupling of pay and performance. See, e.g., Rhee, 
supra note 129; Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (2007); LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). See also 
THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 271-303 (2014) (shows how the 
rise of “supermanagers” has become a major factor of social inequity in the U.S.).  
131  See Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL'Y REV. 1, 14-15 (2008); STOUT, supra note 5, at 71-72; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, 
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adapting Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002).  
132  See Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 909, 911 (2013) (“Hostile takeovers and, later, equity-based executive 
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III.   SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY IN COURTS 1900‒2016 
 
The above rules and aspects of the legal system exemplify the 
multifaceted mechanism through which shareholder primacy works—
through enforceable rules of corporate law in specific transactional spaces 
and through law-facilitated negative and positive incentives in the 
corporate system. However, these facets only partially explain the legal 
mechanism of shareholder primacy. A complete, coherent legal theory, 
which is set forth in infra Section IV, must explain the law’s effect on the 
entire spectrum of managerial conduct. Central to this explanation is the 
role of courts in advancing shareholder primacy as a rule of law.  
This section provides the results of an empirical survey of judicial 
opinions discussing shareholder wealth maximization in the period 1900 to 
2016. It shows that since the 1980s, there has been a marked increase in 
discussion of shareholder profit maximization in judicial opinions. This 
phenomenon raises these questions: (1) How did the courts respond to the 
wave of shareholder-centric consciousness in the business and academic 
communities? (2) Did the responding judicial discussion, rhetoric, and 
expectation affect the legal obligations of boards?  
 
A. Methodology and Raw Data 
 
This article surveys judicial opinions discussing the concept of 
maximizing or increasing shareholder profit in the period from 1900 to 
2016, the era of modern corporations and liberal corporate law.133 A broad 
search term was used to capture cases that discuss at some level enhancing 
shareholder economic interest.134 This article does not claim that the search 
process produced all judicial decisions that discussed the concept of 
                                                                                                                                     
compensation, began to emerge as the new forces creating incentives for managers to focus 
on share value.”).  
133  The New Jersey Incorporation Act of 1896 was the first liberal corporation statute. 
Stephen B. Presser & Richard E. Simpson, Adjusting to the Managerial Revolution: The Law of 
Corporations in the Federal Courts of Delaware 1900-1941, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 730 
(1982). In 1899, Delaware enacted its own liberal corporation statute. Id. at 732.  
134  The Westlaw state and federal case law directories were searched using this search 
term: (maximiz! or enhanc! or increas!) /15 (shareholder! or stockholder!) /15 (profit! or 
wealth! or valu!). The search term was devised to capture statements like this: “Business 
corporations must engage the political process in instrumental terms if they are to maximize 
shareholder value.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310, 454 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). No federal or state court 
opinion has ever used the term “shareholder primacy” independently.  
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shareholder primacy. The search term is not perfect.135 Rather, the claim 
here is that the search process systematically captured a large volume of 
data over a long period, and the data show distinct patterns of judicial 
discussion, analysis, and rhetoric throughout the modern era of 
corporations.  
The search criteria produced a raw data set of 3,035 cases. Even the raw, 
unfiltered data show a distinct pattern. The raw data, shown in Chart 1, 
suggest that courts have increasingly discussed the idea of maximizing 
shareholder profit because since the 1980s corporate transactions have 
sought to achieve that end.136 
 
 
 
The search term, of course, produced many false positives. Two types 
of false positive cases were identified and discarded: (1) irrelevant cases 
                                                                                                                                     
135  Interestingly, Dodge v. Ford does not come up under this search term because the 
key discussion does not meet the Boolean search criterion: “A business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the 
directors are to be employed for that end.” 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (emphasis 
added). The missing term is the word derivative “maximize!” or “increase!” or “enhance!” 
This miss does not undermine the validity of the search criterion. The search term captured 
many important law cases discussing shareholder primacy. See, e.g., eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del.Ch. 2010); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.Ch. 1986).  
136  Charts showing data for the decade 2010‒2019 present actual data for the 7-year 
period 2010‒2016 and linear extrapolations for the remaining 3-year period 2017‒2019. 
Chart 1:  All Judicial Opinions (raw data)
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that are just random hits from the Boolean search term;137 (2) cases where 
the idea of maximizing shareholder wealth was raised by a party or was a 
point of fact, such as a statement in a press release or proxy, but the court 
did not directly engage this assertion with its own voice.138 This second type 
of case could be relevant to some broader analysis of shareholder primacy, 
but recitations of facts do not reveal judicial thinking. Thus, under the 
method here, they are strictly irrelevant cases.   
Although the second type of false positives were discarded, they yield 
three pertinent observations. First, not surprisingly, corporate litigants, 
both shareholders and managers, routinely invoke the concept of profit 
maximization when advancing a complaint or a defense. This type of case 
was far more numerous than random hits. Since the 1980s, parties have 
inundated courts with transactions and claims asserting shareholder profit 
maximization. Second, again not surprisingly, courts do not reproach 
corporate litigants for advancing facts or arguments based on shareholder 
wealth maximization.139 At minimum, court have not found the concept 
inconsistent with corporate law; more likely, they have tacitly accepted the 
principle as a part of corporate law and governance. Third, the case law 
reveals that the lexicon of “maximizing” shareholder wealth, vis-à-vis 
“increasing” or “enhancing,” is ubiquitous. This clearly preferred linguistic 
choice expresses the maximand as the corporate purpose.140  
 
B.  Rise of Shareholder Primacy in Courts 
 
The culling of false positives produced a final list of cases where the 
court discussed in its own voice and thought the concept of shareholder 
primacy. Relevant cases were, then, further sorted into two broad 
categories: Revlon-invoking cases and non-Revlon cases. Because Revlon 
                                                                                                                                     
137  See, e.g., ev3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 540 (Del. 2015) (discussing maximization 
of earn-outs).  
138  See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v. Liberty Media Corp., 29 A.3d 225, 
231-32 (Del. 2011) (quoting the company’s CEO).  
139  When courts explicitly reject the concept, they were bound by state constituency 
statutes. See Murray v. Conseco, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 38, 44 (Ind.App. 2002) (Indiana statute); 
Dixon v. Ladish Co., Inc., 785 F.Supp.2d 746, 753 (E.D.Wisc. 2011) (Wisconsin statute); 
Stilwell Value Partners I, L.P. v. Prudential Mut. Holding Co., 2008 WL 1900945, at *13 
(E.D.Pa. 2008) (Pennsylvania statute); Shepard v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 
1096, 1113 (S.D.Ind. 2001) (Indiana statute); In re Guidant Corp. Shareholders Derivative 
Litig., 2006 WL 290524, at *7-8 (S.D.Ind. 2006) (Indiana statute); In re PHLCORP, 1992 WL 
85013, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Pennsylvania statute). Only a few courts or judges have argued 
against profit maximization independent of constituency statutes. See Day v. Staples, Inc., 
555 F.3d 42, 56 (1st Cir. 2009); Bonoff v. Troy, 187 A.D.2d 302, 303 (N.Y.App.Div. 1st Dep’t 
1992); Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1182 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., concurring).  
140  See infra Section III.B and Table 4. 
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mandates an enforceable duty to maximize shareholder wealth, Revlon-
invoking cases are uninteresting in the sense that they must recite the rule 
in Revlon even if a court ultimately determined that the transaction does not 
come within the Revlon zone. Non-Revlon cases are more revealing because 
any comment by the court, speaking in its own voice, reveals its thought 
process on shareholder wealth maximization when it is not required to do 
so under the Revlon rule or a required recitation thereof.  
Mirroring the raw data, the refined data shows that judicial discussion 
of shareholder-centric concepts have figured prominently in corporate 
litigation starting in the 1980s. The chart below shows federal and state non-
Revlon cases.  
 
 
 
The Delaware experience is consistent with the above data. Delaware 
cases show that judicial discussion of shareholder-centric concepts have 
figured prominently in corporate litigation starting in the 1980s. The table 
and the chart below provide the data, categorized into Revlon and non-
Revlon cases.  
 
 
Chart 2:  Non-Revlon  Federal and State Cases
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Charts 2 and 3 show that in the period 1900‒1979 courts were virtually 
silent on the concept of shareholder primacy. The hockey stick pattern of 
cases should not be surprising in light of well-known economic, business, 
and intellectual histories. It is confirming. The increased discussion of 
maximizing shareholder profit is associated with economic and legal ideas 
on the theory of the firm and agency cost from the 1970s and 1980s, which 
provide the theoretical foundation of shareholder primacy.141  The 1980s 
brought forth “tectonic forces” in the form of hostile takeovers, innovations 
in junk bond financing, economic globalization, and sustained economic 
arguments in the business and academic communities for profit 
maximization.142 The case law, embodying the collective judicial thinking, 
                                                                                                                                     
141  See supra note 51.  
142  In the twentieth century, there had always been two competing conceptions of the 
corporation: the “property conception” that views the corporation as the private property 
of shareholders, and the “society entity conception” that views the corporation as a social 
Table 1:  Delaware cases from 1900 to 2016
Period Revlon Non-Revlon Total Cases
1900─1979 0 0 0
1980─1989 17 4 21
1990─1999 19 7 26
2000─2009 17 18 35
2010─2016 35 25 60
_______ _______ _______
1900─2016 88 54 142
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reflects these developments. The table below tracks the number of cases by 
decades.  
 
 
 
We can also pinpoint the rise of shareholder primacy in courts to a 
specific point in the 1980s. The years 1980-1984 were unremarkable and 
looked very similar to the 1970s in the number of cases. In the time period 
1900 to 1984, the search criteria produced no Delaware case that discussed 
                                                                                                                                     
entity endowed with a social purpose. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the 
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261 266-72 (1992); ADOLPH A. BERLE, POWER 206 
(1967). These two conceptions have coexisted in an uneasy détente for much of the 
twentieth century. Allen supra at 264-65; BERLE, supra at 206. The 1980s brought to the 
surface the underlying tensions between the two conceptions of the corporation.  
 
The dynamic forces in corporation law are easy to identify. The evolution 
of the junk bond market and takeover entrepreneurs, the growth of institutional 
investors, and the striking emergence of a global economy came together in the 
1980s to force massive change in the private sector of our economy. In that 
process, tensions and antinomies in corporation law theory that had been lying 
beneath the surface for a very long time, were forced out into the open. As a 
result, during the 1980s corporation law became not boring and marginal, but 
important, even fascinating. Articles on corporate theory found their way into 
leading journals. Basic questions excited argument, and the most basic 
questions―What is a corporation? What purpose does it serve?―became the 
stuff of wide discussion and of statutory activity. Everything old became new 
again. 
 
Allen, supra, at 263-64.  
Table 2:  Non-Revlon  cases from 1900 to 2016
  Period Delaware Other States Federal 
  1900─1909 0 1 1
  1910─1919 0 1 1
  1920─1929 0 1 1
  1930─1939 0 3 1
  1940─1949 0 1 1
  1950─1959 0 1 1
  1960─1969 0 1 3
  1970─1979 0 2 1
  1980─1989 4 3 24
  1990─1999 7 3 22
  2000─2009 18 21 28
  2010─2016 25 10 30
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shareholder primacy in its own voice.143 The first case in Delaware was in 
1985, the seminal decision by the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. 
Household International, Inc. where the court validated the poison pill.144 In 
that year, the court also decided several other landmark cases in the 
takeover realm.145 In 1986, portending the new era of shareholder-centrism, 
Delaware courts decided two seminal cases in corporate law, which 
partially but substantially advanced shareholder primacy in specific 
transactional spaces: Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc. and Revlon v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc.146 The table below tracks the number of cases in each 
year of the decade.147  
                                                                                                                                     
143  Only one case could be read as dealing with profit maximization. In Warshaw v. 
Calhoun, 213 A.2d 539 (Del.Ch. 1965), a minority shareholder of a personal holding 
company complained that the controlling shareholder was depressing the stock value of 
the company by maintaining too large of an investment stake in a portfolio company. The 
court held that the board is not required to reduce its investment stake. Id. at 542-43. Thus, 
Warshaw unremarkably upholds managerial authority over a shareholder’s assertion of a 
strategy to maximize profit.  
144  490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985). “The very fact that the director wants to enhance 
corporate profits is in part attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that 
they will not oust him.” Id. at 1074.  
145  See Unocal v Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A2d 946, 955-56 (Del 1985); Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
146  See supra Sections II.A and II.B.  
147  Delaware: Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 1989 WL 79880 (Del.Ch. 
1989); In re Resorts Intern. Shareholders Litigation, 1988 WL 92749 (Del.Ch. 1988); Katz v. 
Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.Ch. 1986); Moran v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 
1059 (Del. 1985). An important case in the takeover field, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time Inc., is not included in this list because there was no explicit embrace of shareholder 
primacy: “a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is not 
under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in the context 
of a takeover.” 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).  
States: Houser v. Philadelphia Gas Commission, 1986 WL 501533 (Pa.Ct. Common 
Pleas 1986); El Paso Elec. Co. v. New Mexico Public Serv. Com'n, 706 P.2d 511, 513-14 (N.M. 
1985); Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (N.Y. 1984).  
Federal: McCain v. Phoenix Resources, Inc., 1989 WL 146212, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Newell Co. v. Vermont American Corp., 725 F.Supp. 351, 375 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Estate of 
Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F.Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Gray v. Zondervan Corp., 712 
F.Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (W.D.Mich. 1988); Gillette Co. v. RB Partners, 693 F.Supp. 1266, 1274 
(D.Mass. 1988); Field v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 948 (2d Cir. 1988); Terrydale Liquidating 
Trust v. Barness, 846 F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1988); Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 
F.Supp. 1289, 1297(N.D.Ill. 1988); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 235 (1988); Samjens 
Partners I v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 663 F.Supp. 614, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Champion 
Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp., 650 F.Supp. 87, 88-89 (N.D.Ill. 1986); Harvard 
Industries, Inc. v. Tyson, 1986 WL 36295, at *2 (E.D.Mich. 1986); Spinner Corp. v. Princeville 
Development Corp., 1986 WL 15545, at *8 (D. Hawaii 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. 
CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642 
F.Supp. 917, 923 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 638 F.Supp. 
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During the leveraged financed merger boom of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the debate on profit maximization was largely in the takeover arena. 
Since then, the takeover arena has continued to be the focus of the debate 
on the purpose of the corporation and shareholder wealth maximization.148 
The years 1985-1986 mark an inflection point, at which time courts began to 
opine on shareholder primacy and the trend has been unabated since then 
(see Charts 2 and 3). 
The rise of shareholder primacy is also marked by a significant shift in 
lexicon. Before the mid-1980s, when courts discussed shareholder profit, 
they tended to use the word choice “increasing” or “enhancing” profit, 
indicating an obligation to make a profit without stating a maximand or 
prioritizing the purpose of a corporation. Since 1985, “maximizing” profit 
has become the dominant term in the conversation in corporate transactions 
and litigation, which reflects the belief held by shareholders and 
                                                                                                                                     
802, 805 (N.D.Ill. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th 
Cir. 1986); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 635 F.Supp. 1174, 1179 (N.D.Ill. 1986); 
Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 128 (7th Cir. 1984); General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge Coppee 
S.A., 1981 WL 1408 (N.D.Tex. 1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th 
Cir. 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 390, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); 
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980); United Operating Co. v. Karnes, 482 
F.Supp. 1029, 1030-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  
148  See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); William T. 
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging 
the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002); Allen, supra note 142, at 263.  
Table 3:  Non-Revlon  cases  in the 1980s
   Year Delaware Other States Federal
   1980 0 0 3
   1981 0 0 2
   1982 0 0 0
   1983 0 0 0
   1984 0 1 1
   1985 1 1 0
   1986 1 1 8
   1987 0 0 1
   1988 1 0 6
   1989 1 0 3
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management.149 Chart 4 tracks the use of the term “maximize” in federal 
and state judicial opinions from the period 1900‒2016 as a percentage of 
total cases indicating an obligation to “increase,” “enhance,” or “maximize” 
shareholder profit.  
 
 
 
The shift in rhetoric is definitionally and legally significant. Enhance is 
defined as an increase. 150  Maximize is defined as an increase to a 
maximum,151 and it connotes the economic concept of a maximand. The 
choice of term has legal significance. Corporate law statutes of all fifty states 
and the Model Business Corporation Act do not mandate the purpose of the 
business corporation. However, the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Corporate Governance addresses the issue. It provides: “a corporation 
should have its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to 
enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”152 The ALI choice of the 
term “enhancing” was deliberate. It reveals a reluctance to embrace a strong 
form of shareholder primacy; or stated more strongly, it rejects economic 
efficiency as the purpose of the corporation.153 Thus, the sudden shift in the 
judicial choice of terms in the mid-1980s reveals an awareness and embrace 
of the concept of maximand.  
                                                                                                                                     
149  The term “profit maximization” has long been in public and academic discussion. 
See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 3, at 113 (1967).  
150  WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 413 (1986).   
151  Id. at 734.  
152  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (1994) 
(emphasis added).  
153  Bratton, supra note 5, at 714. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b)(2), (3) (1994) (discussing ethical implications of 
shareholder primacy).  
Chart 4:  Percentage of "Maximization" Lexicon
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C. Integration and Dutification 
 
The nature of the judicial discussion has evolved with judicial embrace 
of the concept of shareholder primacy becoming stronger over time. To 
show this phenomenon, this article categorizes non-Revlon cases into four 
types of cases reflecting various degrees of judicial embrace. Recognition 
indicates cases where the court states as a point of fact or observation that 
directors or shareholders seek to maximize profit, thus recognizing 
shareholder primacy at the factual level of business practice.154 Application 
indicates cases where the court applies the concept of shareholder primacy 
in the process of reasoning toward the case holding or issue resolution.155 
Integration indicates cases where the court uses the concept as a rationale 
for another principle or rule of corporate law, thus integrating the concept 
into the rule of law.156 Dutification indicates cases where the court prescribes 
profit maximization as a managerial obligation, thus clearly expressing 
shareholder primacy as a legal obligation.157  
These four categories present an increasing spectrum of judicial 
endorsement of shareholder primacy: from embracing the concept at the 
factual level to incorporating the principle at the level of law and legal 
obligation. Chart 5 provides the number of cases by these four categories in 
the period 1980 to 2019 (projected).  
                                                                                                                                     
154  See, e.g., In re Dunkin' Donuts Shareholders Litigation, 1990 WL 189120, at *9 
(Del.Ch. 1990) (“Stockholders, on the other hand, do not care if the bidder gets a ‘good 
deal,’ they want the most compensation available for their holding in the company. As 
recent cases in this Court illustrate, maximization of shareholder value is often achieved 
through an auction of a target company.”).  
155  See, e.g., In re IXC Communications, Inc. v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., 1999 WL 1009174, 
at *5 (Del.Ch. 1999) (“It seems that at this preliminary stage that, absent a complete review 
of the facts, that the IXC board's judgments about what deals and offers might have been 
more or less viable than others reflect a vigorous process for maximizing shareholder value. 
I have not been presented facts that would allow me to conclude that the IXC board did 
not exercise its best judgment in deciding which suitors merited serious consideration and 
which ones perhaps did not.”).  
156  See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986) (“It is the 
obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the 
corporation's stockholders; that they may sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others (even 
assuming that a transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully be said 
to be at his expense) does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”).  
157  See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del.Ch. 2013) (“Directors 
of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its stockholders 
which require that they strive prudently and in good faith to maximize the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants.”).  
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The number of total cases are increasing with time. The above chart 
shows that cases in the categories of integration and dutification, the 
highest level of judicial embrace, are increasing. Also, note that dutification 
cases are a recent phenomenon, and since 2000 their numbers have 
increased significantly.  
The concept of shareholder primacy has been integrated into a number 
of legal principles and rules of law. An example of integration is seen in In 
re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.158 The controlling shareholder 
made a tender offer to minority shareholders with an intended backend 
short-form merger. The court noted that there were two plausible options 
for the standard of judicial review, the choice of which would be critical to 
the outcome of any corporate litigation.159 The Delaware chancery court 
discussed the underlying policy and principle guiding the choice of rule.160  
 
. . . Much of the judicial carpentry in the corporate law occurs 
in this context, in which judges must supplement the broadly 
enabling features of statutory corporation law with equitable 
principles sufficient to protect against abuse and unfairness, but 
not so rigid as to stifle useful transactions that could increase the 
shareholder and societal wealth generated by the corporate form. 
In building the common law, judges forced to balance these 
concerns cannot escape making normative choices, based on 
                                                                                                                                     
158  808 A.2d 421, 424 (Del.Ch. 2002) (Strine, V.C.).  
159  Id. at 433. Compare Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 
1117 (Del. 1994), with Solomon v. Pathe Communications Corp., 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del. 
1996).  
160  808 A.2d at 434-35 (emphasis added).  
Chart 5:  State and Federal Non-Revlon  Cases
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imperfect information about the world. This reality clearly 
pervades the area of corporate law implicated by this case. When a 
transaction to buy out the minority is proposed, is it more 
important to the development of strong capital markets to hold 
controlling stockholders and target boards to very strict (and 
litigation-intensive) standards of fiduciary conduct? Or is more 
stockholder wealth generated if less rigorous protections are adopted, 
which permit acquisitions to proceed so long as the majority has 
not misled or strong-armed the minority? . . .  
 
The court adopted the rule of law that advanced the policy consideration in 
favor of profit maximization.161  
The number of integration cases are significant and increasing. Many 
corporate law doctrines, as well as doctrines from other fields of law such 
as securities regulation, contracts, bankruptcy, and ERISA, have been 
explicitly justified on the rationale of shareholder wealth maximization.  
Difference in duties between nonprofit and for profit corporations.―Courts 
have imposed different rules on public nonprofit entities. These rules are 
justified on the rationale that nonprofit and for profit corporations have 
different purposes. Managers of a business corporation are “guided by their 
duty to maximize long term profit for the benefit of the corporation and the 
shareholders.” 162  However, a nonprofit corporation’s purpose is not to 
generate a profit and instead the board’s duty of loyalty is to pursue the 
charitable or public benefit mission.163 
Business judgment rule.―A foundational rule in corporate law is the 
business judgment rule, which grants the board broad discretion to manage 
the business and affairs of the corporation absent a showing of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. The business judgment rule has been justified on the 
rationale: “Through the business judgment rule, Delaware law encourages 
corporate fiduciaries to attempt to increase stockholder wealth by engaging 
in those risks that, in their business judgment, are in the best interest of the 
corporation without the debilitating fear that they will be held personally 
liable if the company experiences losses.”164  
                                                                                                                                     
161  Id. at 444 (adopting the Solomon standard).  
162  Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Services, Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 503-04 
(Tenn.App. 2002). Accord State ex rel. Little People's Child Development Center, Inc. v. 
Little People's Child Development Center, Inc., 2009 WL 103509, at *7 (Tenn.App. 2009).  
163  Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 503-04.  
164  In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 4826104, at *23 (Del.Ch. 
2011) (quoting In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 139 
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Corporate charter.―Corporate charters permit corporations to pursue 
profit maximization in diverse ways, subject to the requirement that the 
corporation engage in “lawful business” and “lawful acts.”165 
Shareholder voting rights.―A foundational rule in corporate law is that 
shareholders have governance rights through voting. This rule has been 
justified on the rationale that “[w]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a 
decision-making mechanism is the premise that stockholders with 
economic ownership are expressing their collective view as to whether a 
particular course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth 
maximization.”166 
Derivative suits.―A foundational rule in corporate law is that 
shareholders may bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. This 
form of action has been justified on the rationale that shareholders can 
“pursue monitoring activities that are wealth increasing for the collectivity 
(the corporation or the body of its shareholders).”167 Instrumental aspects 
of derivative suits, such as attorney fees168 and the demand requirement169, 
have been justified on the rationale of shareholder wealth.  
Shareholder inspection rights.―Corporate law permits shareholders 
certain inspection rights. A shareholder must have a credible basis for 
showing mismanagement, waste, or wrongdoing for compel an inspection 
of the books and records. This rule has been justified on the rationale that it 
“maximizes stockholder value by limiting the range of permitted 
stockholder inspections to those that might have merit.”170  
Creditor’s standing to bring derivative suit.―A well-established rule in 
                                                                                                                                     
(Del.Ch. 2009)). Accord In re Ambac Financial Group, Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 305 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 
2011); In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del.Ch. 
2009); Granada Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F.Supp. 448, 454 (N.D. Ohio 1993); 
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. 
InterNorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 390, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 
292 (3d Cir. 1980).  
165  In re Massey Energy Co., 2011 WL 2176479, at *20 & n.144 (Del.Ch. 2011) (citing 
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2, at 18 (1986)).  
166  Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010). Accord In re 
CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 4 A.3d 397, 416 (Del.Ch. 2010); Kurz v. Holbrook, 
989 A.2d 140, 178-79 (Del.Ch. 2010).  
167  In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 548 (Del.Ch. 2014) (quoting Bird v. Lida, 
Inc., 681 A.2d 399, 403 (Del.Ch.1996)). Accord Keller v. Estate of McRedmond, 495 S.W.3d 
852, 868 (Tenn. 2016); Case Financial, Inc. v. Alden, 2009 WL 2581873, at *7 n.41 (Del.Ch. 
2009).  
168  In re Del Monte Foods Co. Shareholders Litigation, 2011 WL 2535256, at *14 n.5 
(Del.Ch. 2011); In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 65 A.3d 1116, 1140 n.7 
(Del.Ch. 2011).  
169  Johnson v. Glassman, 950 A.2d 215, 220 (N.J.Super. 2008).  
170  Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 125 (Del. 2006).  
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corporate law is that creditors have standing to bring derivative suits for a 
breach of fiduciary duty when a corporation is in insolvency. This rule has 
been justified on the rationale that it comports with the “directors' duty to 
maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those 
having an interest in it.”171  
Maximization of residual value.―A related concept to a creditor’s 
standing to bring a derivative action is the rule that requires a manager or 
trustee to maximize the value of the firm in insolvency, including value as 
to shareholders. This rule has been justified on the rationale that “strive in 
good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of the 
corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants, the ultimate 
beneficiaries of the firm's value.”172  This rationale is the same one that 
supports profit maximization as the economically efficient goal, which is 
the maximization of a firm’s residual value. Outside of insolvency, the 
residual value in assets and earnings belong to shareholders.  
Priority rule in bankruptcy.―A fundamental concept in bankruptcy and 
corporate law is that creditors must be paid before shareholders. In 
bankruptcy under the rule of absolute priority, creditors are paid first in the 
order of seniority. In corporate law under the rule of limited liability, the 
claims of creditors are protected ahead of shareholder interest in the 
corporation. These rule are justified on the rationale: “Because, unlike 
creditors and depositors, stockholders stand to gain a share of corporate 
profits, stockholders should take the primary risk of the enterprise failing. 
This scheme of priorities is consistent with the economic theory of 
                                                                                                                                     
171  N. Am. Catholic Educ. Prog. Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 
2007). Accord In re AWTR Liquidation Inc., 548 B.R. 300, 328 n.12 (C.D.Cal. Bankr. 2016); 
Caulfield v. Packer Group, Inc., 56 N.E.3d 509, 518 (Ill.App. 2016); Lichtenstein v. Willkie 
Farr & Gallagher LLP, 120 A.D.3d 1095, 1097 (N.Y.Sup. 1st App.Div. 2014); In re Grace 
Manor Health Care Facility, Inc., 2012 WL 1021036, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2012); Sanford 
v. Waugh & Co., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 836, 845 (Tenn.Super. 2010); Production Resources Group, 
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 777, 787, 790-91 (Del.Ch. 2004); Official Committee 
of Bond Holders of Metricom, Inc. v. Derrickson, 2004 WL 2151336, at *3 (N.D.Cal. 2004); 
In re RSL COM PRIMECALL, Inc., 2003 WL 22989669, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2003).  
172  Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172, 176 (Del.Ch. 
2014) (quoting In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 40-41 (Del.Ch.2013)). Accord 
Badii ex rel. Badii v. Metropolitan Hospice, Inc., 2012 WL 764961, at *9 (Del.Ch. 2012); In re 
JL Building, LLC, 452 B.R. 854, 862 (D. Utah Bankr. 2011); In re C.W. Mining Co., 636 F.3d 
1257, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2011); In re Amcast Indus. Corp., 365 B.R. 91, 104 n.6, 107 n.7 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007); Mukamal v. Bakes, 383 B.R. 798, 826 (S.D.Fla. 2007); In re Hechinger Investment 
Co. of Delaware, 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D.Del. 2002); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 846 
F.2d 845, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1988).  
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corporations.”173  
Restructuring and exchange offers.―In a restructuring or other corporate 
transactions, the economic value of debt instruments may be diminished to 
enhance shareholder value. Such transactions are justified on the rationale: 
“It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the 
long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders; that they may 
sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others . . . does not for that reason 
constitute a breach of duty.”174 
Mergers and acquisitions.―The poison pill has long been used a takeover 
defense. Courts have noted that the poison pill may have value maximizing 
uses. 175  The poison pill has been justified on the rationale that it is 
“plausibly related to the goal of stockholder wealth maximization.”176 A 
number of other issues and rules in the takeover context has been justified 
on the rationale of shareholder profit maximization.177  
                                                                                                                                     
173  Gaff v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 919 F.2d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 1990).  
174  Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del.Ch. 1986). Accord U.S. Bank Nat. 
Ass'n v. Stanley, 297 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex.App. 2009).  
175  Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., 907 F.Supp. 1545, 1557 
(D.Del. 1995) (citing City Capital Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del.Ch.1988)).  
176  Cooperstock v. Pennwalt Corp., 820 F.Supp. 921, 924 (E.D.Pa. 1993). Accord Desert 
Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F.Supp. 1289, 1297(N.D.Ill. 1988); Dynamics Corp. of 
America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.).  
177  See Employer Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Caspersen, 
2006 WL 435289, at *8 (N.J.Sup. 2006) (duty to inform in a merger “maximize[s] the value 
obtained for their shareholders”); In re CompuCom Systems, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 
2005 WL 2481325, at *6 (Del.Ch. 2005) (“The reasons for the law's tolerance of [sale of 
controlling stake] is clear―as the owner of a majority share, the controlling shareholder's 
interest in maximizing value is directly aligned with that of the minority.”); Alessi v. 
Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 947 (Del.Ch. 2004) (“secrecy increases shareholder wealth” in the 
context of sale of the company); Marcoux v. Prim, 2004 WL 830393, at *13 (N.C.Super. 2004) 
("This Court must balance protecting shareholder rights with preserving the freedom of 
shareholders to approve or block a proposed merger according to their own economic 
interests. A standard that is too lenient in either direction can have adverse repercussions 
on both shareholder rights and maximizing shareholder value."); Fulk v. Washington 
Service Associates, Inc., 2002 WL 1402273, at *7 (Del.Ch. 2002) (noting the “the larger 
question—how best to maximize value for the shareholders in a sale of the Company” in a 
dissolution and liquidation); Blanchard v. Edgemark Financial Corp., 2000 WL 33223385, 
at *3 (N.D.Ill. 2000) (“Secrecy maximizes shareholder wealth in the context of public 
corporations by encouraging potential bidders to offer their most aggressive price on a 
deal.”); ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 104-05 (Del.Ch. 1999) (noting that “the 
Delaware law of mergers and acquisitions has given primacy to the interests of 
stockholders in being free to maximize value from their ownership of stock without 
improper compulsion from executory contracts entered into by boards”); Avon Products, 
Inc. v. Chartwell Associates L.P., 738 F.Supp. 686, 689 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (explaining 
certain statutory merger rules as presumably “an effort to maximize stockholder value”); 
Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642 F.Supp. 917, 923 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (indicating 
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Shareholder proxy.―A proxy rule proposed by the SEC related to the 
direct nomination and election of directors by shareholders was recently 
litigated in a prominent case. The court struck down the proposed rule and 
justified the decision on the rationale that the rule did not establish a 
connection to “the goal of maximizing shareholder value . . . [and] the 
privilege also leaves corporate officers freer to exercise their business 
judgment in their shareholders’ best interests.”178  
Contract privilege.―In some states, corporate officers are privileged to 
interfere with contracts. This rule is justified on the rationale that the 
“privilege maximizes firm value by incentivizing officers to prioritize the 
interests of shareholders over those of contract creditors.”179 
ERISA.―Courts circumscribe the exercise of discretion of an ERISA 
plan administrator and engages in judicial review of the administrator’s 
conduct. This rule is justified on the rationale that “as the insurer, [it] reaps 
the financial rewards of its claims decisions, and, as a subsidiary of a 
publicly held and traded corporation, has a conflicting fiduciary obligation 
to maximize profits for the benefit of shareholders.”180  
In conclusion, a review of the above integration cases shows that 
shareholder primacy is like a filamentary principle that weaves through 
many important rules of corporate law and the corporate system. Courts 
have recognized that shareholder profit is the rationale for many important 
or foundational rules of corporate law.  
In addition to integration cases, the case law also shows the beginning, 
perhaps, of explicit rule of law emerging in the form of an unconditional 
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth. This is a recent phenomenon. 
Before 2000, there were no dutification cases. In the period 2000‒2009, there 
were a handful of dutification cases.181 In the period 2010‒2016, such cases 
                                                                                                                                     
that defensive tactics should have “a plausible measure for maximizing shareholder 
wealth”); Alpert v. 28 Williams Street Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19, 28 (N.Y. 1984) (freeze-out 
merger must “ultimately seek to increase the individual wealth of the remaining 
shareholders”).  
178  Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 1144, 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
179  Service By Air, Inc. v. Phoenix Cartage and Air Freight, LLC, 78 F.Supp.3d 852, 864 
(N.D.Ill. 2015).  
180  O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 1999 WL 617891, at *7 (4th Cir. 1999).  
181  E*TRADE Financial Corp. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 631 F.Supp.2d 313, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); Rodriguez v. Loudeye Corp., 189 P.3d 168, 174-75 (Wash.App. 2008); Kreinberg v. 
Dow Chemical Co., 2007 WL 2782060, at *4 (E.D.Mich. 2007); Jasinover v. Rouse Co., 2004 
WL 3135516, at *9 (Md.Cir.Ct. 2004).  
Vol. 102 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 45 
 
 
 
      
                                                                                                                                         
have increased significantly, both in Delaware182 and other jurisdictions.183 
The 2010 Delaware chancery court opinion in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark seems to have ushered in a new period in which courts have 
become comfortable with linking shareholder wealth maximization to a 
generalized statement of a board’s obligation.184 Notably, excepting Revlon-
invoked cases, explicit statements about shareholder profit maximization 
and the conception of corporate purpose tied to the private property model 
of the corporation were largely absent in the prior decades.185  
The number of dutification cases is caveated by two facts. First, all post-
2009 dutification cases are trial court opinions. 186  Second, although 
Delaware has seen a sharp increase in dutification cases after eBay Domestic 
                                                                                                                                     
182  Virtus Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2015 WL 580553, at *16 & n.5 (Del.Ch. 
2015) (Laster, V.C.); In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litigation, 102 A.3d 205, 253-53 
(Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 113 A.3d 167, 179-80 
(Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, 
V.C.); In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 88 A.3d 1, 34-36 (Del.Ch. 2014) 
(Laster, V.C.); In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20, 37 (Del.Ch. 2013) (Laster, 
V.C.); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 668 (Del.Ch. 2012) (Laster, V.C.); eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del.Ch. 2010) (Chandler, C.).  
183  IBEW Local No. 129 Ben. Fund v. Tucci, 2015 WL 9275480, at *5 (Mass.Super. 2015); 
Stilwell Value Partners, IV, L.P. v. Cavanaugh, 49 Misc.3d 1210(A) (N.Y.Sup. 2015); In re 
Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 2014 WL 4560441, at *12 (W.D.La. Bankr. 2014) (citing eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 (Del.Ch. 2010)); Nakkhumpun v. Taylor, 
2014 WL 321156, at *5 (D.Colo. 2014); In re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 491 B.R. 747, 776 
(W.D.La. Bankr. 2013) (citing eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35 
(Del.Ch. 2010)); KD Gretna Properties, LLC v. Decatur Realty Corp., 2013 WL 1288048, at 
*5 (E.D.La. 2013); Giles v. ICG, Inc., 789 F.Supp.2d 706, 714 (S.D.W.Va. 2011); Akanthos 
Capital Management, LLC v. CompuCredit Holdings Corp., 770 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1333 
(N.D.Ga. 2011); In re Celestica Inc. Securities Litig., 2010 WL 4159587, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Nucor Corp. v. U.S., 675 F.Supp.2d 1340, 1348-49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2010).  
184  The specific language of profit maximization has been favorably cited. See 
OptimisCorp v. Waite, 2015 WL 5147038, at *61 n.520 (Del.Ch. 2015) (Parsons, V.C.); Vitus 
Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chemical Co., 2015 WL 580553, at *16 n.5 (Del.Ch. 2015) (Laster, 
V.C.); Allen v. El Paso Pipeline GP Co., L.L.C., 113 A.3d 167, 179 (Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, 
V.C.); Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 187 (Del.Ch. 2014) 
(Laster, V.C.); In re Rural Metro Corp., 102 A.3d 205, 253, (Del.Ch. 2014) (Laster, V.C.); In 
re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 2014 WL 4560441, at *12 (Bankr.W.D.La. 2014); In re Trados 
Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 36 (Del.Ch. 2013) (Laster, V.C.); Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. 
Corp., 2013 WL 5967028, at *11 (Del.Ch. 2013) (Laster, Ch.); In re Gulf Fleet Holdings, Inc., 
491 B.R. 747, 776 (Bankr.W.D.La. 2013); Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, 62 A.3d 649, 668 (Del.Ch. 
2012) (Laster, V.C.).  
185  Not that long ago, Delaware jurists were writing that there were competing models 
of the corporation with different views on the purpose of the corporation. See Allen et al., 
supra note 148, at 1075-77; Allen, supra note 142, at 264-66. See also supra note 142. Allen, 
Jacobs and Strine suggested that Delaware corporate was equivocal and did not strongly 
embraced either the property or entity models. Allen et al., supra note 148, at 1078-79.  
186  See supra notes 182-183.  
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Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, all cases are attributable to a single vice 
chancellor.187 However, he is not alone in the Delaware judiciary in his 
enthusiasm for the idea. Chief Justice Strine has written in a recent law 
review article that “corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their 
duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the 
stockholders.”188 Of course, it is an addition step to go from sole authoring 
a law review article to announcing a rule in the majority opinion of a state 
supreme court. Thus far, a duty to maximize profit has not been announced 
by the Delaware supreme court, but its chief justice saying so publicly is of 
course important.  
 
IV.   THE LEGAL MECHANISM OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
 
The above empirical evidence shows that shareholder primacy is not 
independent of law. It has a legal foundation. In much of social interactions, 
law per prescription or proscription is a driving force of behavior. Yet, 
shareholder primacy clearly does not and cannot work doctrinally through 
a rule‒sanction of duty. Academically Dodge v. Ford may be iconic, but 
doctrinally the case is irrelevant. It is farfetched to believe that a rarely cited, 
hundred year-old case from Michigan could have actually influenced 
business and economic history to its current state. When juxtaposed with 
the empirical data, the hypothesis tells a story that Dodge v. Ford remained 
dormant and ineffective for the first sixty years since its publication in 1919 
only to have suddenly become prophetic in the past thirty years, though it 
has never been cited much outside of law review articles. This narrative of 
its impact does not make sense. In truth, appellate courts have not imposed 
a duty to maximize profit, the breach of which would subject a board to a 
cognizable derivative action, judicial review of substantive business 
decisions, and potential liability. Courts have not embraced this form of 
law. Therefore, a positive legal theory must answer: Is shareholder primacy 
law? If so, how does the law work?  
 
A.  Defining “Norm” 
 
Corporate law scholarship refers to shareholder primacy as a norm, 
which is really a short-hand for saying that a rule‒sanction framework does 
not exist and thus a norm must be at work. The subject of social norms has 
                                                                                                                                     
187  See supra note 182 (citing opinions written by Vice Chancellor Travis Laster).  
188  Strine, supra note 4, at 136.  
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generated significant scholarship.189 For the purpose of this article, Richard 
Posner provides a workable, generally accepted definition by scholars in 
the field:  
 
Laws are promulgated by public institutions, such as legislatures, 
regulatory agencies, and courts, after well-defined deliberative 
procedures, and are enforced by the police power of the state, 
which ultimately means by threat of violence. Norms are not 
necessarily promulgated at all. If they are, it is not by the state. 
Often a norm will result from (and crystallize) the gradual 
emergence of a consensus. . . . A norm is a social rule that does not 
depend on government for either promulgation or enforcement.190  
 
There are other definitions of a norm, such as the philosophical concept 
of “ought” and the mathematical concept of probabilistically consistent 
behavior,191 but many leading scholars in the study of law and social norms 
define norms as a community-prescribed behavior enforced through some 
means other than the threat of governmental sanction.192  
The labeling of shareholder primacy as a norm is consistent with the 
above definition. Shareholder primacy is said to be a “principle,”193 “belief 
system,” 194  or “ideology” 195  that has broad community support for its 
normative content.196 It is not enforceable by law through statute or judicial 
order. Its legitimacy, it is believed, is based on a norm, originated from the 
persuasiveness of economic theories and policy arguments, internalized by 
                                                                                                                                     
189  See, e.g., SOCIAL NORMS, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND THE LAW (ed. Eric A. Posner, 
2007); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). Scholars have studied norms at work in commercial law. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra 
note 11; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).  
190   Richard A. Posner, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions, 
19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369-70 (1999).  
191  Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 954-55 
(1997). See HART, supra note 10, at 44, 55 (discussing “customs” and “habits” as distinct 
from obligations); Green, supra note 12, at 517 (“Not all practice rules are obligation-
imposing, however; most are just ordinary customs and conventions.”). 
192  See Cooter, supra note 191, at 9550; Sunstein, supra note 122, at 915; Oliver Hart, 
Norms and the Theory of the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2001); Ellickson, supra note 
123, at 3; Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of 
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1579-80 (2000).  
193  Allen et al., note 148, at 1079.  
194  Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 975, 977 (2006).    
195  STOUT, supra note 5, at 2.  
196  See supra notes 6 and 55 and accompanying text.  
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the business community and presumably enforced through non-state 
censure. 197  This widely-perceived account is inaccurate because it 
diminishes the role of courts and the centrality of law in imposing an 
obligation on managers. Logic alone suggests this: If corporate governance 
is founded on law, we should expect one of its fundamental tenets to be 
founded on the law and the legal system. Experience confirms this: Courts 
have embraced shareholder primacy over a thirty-year period. This fact is 
not without legal effect. Shareholder primacy is not just a norm, such as 
taking off one’s hat in a house of worship or rising for the national anthem, 
conduct that are widely observed, not because of a legal obligation, but 
because of social pressure and internalization of custom. Shareholder 
primacy ultimately derives its legitimacy from judicial acceptance and the 
obligation it creates demands compliance.  
The missing idea in a positive legal theory of shareholder primacy is that law 
can be expressed by the government as an obligation without formal sanction if the 
application of such police power would undermine other important rules and a 
sanction is not needed to achieve efficacy of the law’s prescription.  
 
B. Shareholder Primacy as Obligation 
 
Shareholder primacy is not a legal duty, but is instead a legal 
obligation.198  H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law provides an insight into 
obligations that rise to law. In theorizing the jurisprudential question “what 
is law?” he critiqued Austin’s idea of law as a general command backed by 
the coercive force of the threat of government.199 Austinian form of law 
aptly describes fields such as criminal law, torts, and regulated industries, 
which are constructed on the idea of duty, breach, and sanction. 200 
Fiduciary duties of corporate managers, being liability rules, are also in this 
form of duty-based rules enforceable through sanction.201   
However, some laws are not in Austinian form. A law can be either 
unenforceable or simply enabling. A particularly relevant example in the 
field of business organizations is laws that “confer legal powers on private 
                                                                                                                                     
197  See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
198  See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.  
199  HART, supra note 10, at 18-25. See Green, supra note 12, at 517 (“sanction theories 
are now nearly friendless”).  
200  Id. at 27.  
201  See supra note 36.  
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individuals.”202 Corporate law is said to be enabling, characterized in large 
parts by its power to enable a set of privately ordered legal and economic 
relationships among corporate constituents.203 Thus, the Austinian concept 
of law does not fully describe other forms of law.204  
A rule imposes an obligation when the general demand for conformity 
is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon those who deviate 
is great.205 Social customs and obligations differ on the degree of social 
pressure: “What is important is that the insistence on importance or 
seriousness of social pressure behind the rules is the primary factor 
determining whether they are thought of as giving rise to obligations.”206 
An obligation is supported not only by a general demand for compliance 
and social pressure, but also such demand for compliance is considered a 
legitimate response to deviations.207  An obligation is mandatory, which 
distinguishes it from other norms.208  
                                                                                                                                     
202  HART, supra note 10, at 28. These laws include contracts, wills, and marriages. Id. 
at 27. They also include the laws of non-corporate entities that provide greater contractual 
flexibility than the corporate form. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (“It is the 
policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract 
and to the enforceability of limited liability company agreements.”). See also LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 37 (2010) (suggesting that LLCs “have real 
contracts” unlike corporations).  
203  Shintom Co., Ltd. v. Audiovox Corp., 888 A.2d 225, 227 (Del. 2005); Williams v. 
Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996); William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in 
Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993). The idea of enabling contractual 
relationship in a firm is seen in economic theories of the firm, which formed the basic ideas 
of law and economic conception of corporate law. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. 
POL. ECON. 288, 290 (1980). 
204  HART, supra note 10, at 79-81.  
205  Id. at 86-87. Other scholars have been influenced by Hart’s idea of an effective 
obligation. See Cooter, supra note 191, at 955 & n.45.  
206  HART, supra note 10, at 87 (emphasis in original).  
207  H.L.A. Hart, Answers to Eight Questions, in READING HLA HART’S THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 283 (Luis Duarte D’Almeida ed., 2013). “What is necessary is that there should be a 
critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard, and that 
this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity, 
and in acknowledgments that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which find 
their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of ‘ought’, ‘must’, and ‘should’, 
‘right’ and ‘wrong’.” HART, supra note 10, at 57. See id. at 90 (“the violation of a rule is not 
merely a basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for the 
hostility”).  
208  Kenneth Einar Himma, A Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligation: Social 
Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the Legal Obligation of Citizens, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURE OF LAW, at 162, 166 (eds. Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa, 
2013). See Sunstein, supra note 123, at 914 (describing Hart’s concept of legal obligations as 
a subclass of norms). 
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In a legal system, the government, such as the judiciary, applies rules 
of recognition to determine obligations, such as when common law courts 
determine the rule of law. A court may observe general characteristics 
possessed by an obligation and its “relation to judicial decisions.”209 Courts 
do not always state the rule applied to recognize an obligation, but instead 
it is frequently shown in the decision: thus, “when courts reach a particular 
conclusion on the footing that a particular rule has been correctly identified 
as law, what they say has a special authoritative status conferred on it by 
other rules.”210 The identification of a rule in the legal system validates the 
obligation.211 Validity of a rule differs from its efficacy.212 If law is more 
than the Austinian concept, it requires a dissociation of validity from 
efficacy because an obligation may not always be sanctionable and thus 
enforced.213  However, the internalization of a rule as a legal obligation 
presuppose the truth of a legal system that is “generally efficacious.”214  
Shareholder primacy is more than a social custom or social norm. It is 
a legal obligation in the Hartian tradition: it is an important rule imbued 
with a “seriousness of social pressure” though it is not enforceable; it is 
recognized and institutionalized by courts; it is said to be foundational to 
corporate law and governance. The reprobation directed at one who 
deviates from the rule would be considered legitimate. This social pressure 
may be inconsistent at times with the corporate manager’s own value 
system, but nevertheless she may feel compelled to obey the rule.215 Thus, 
outlier cases like Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark are insubstantial at the 
instrumental level of doctrine;216 their significance is at the expressive level. 
                                                                                                                                     
209  HART, supra note 10, at 95.  
210  Id. at 101-02.  
211  Id. at 103. See Roscoe E. Hill, Legal Validity and Legal Obligation, 80 YALE L.J. 47, 51 
(1970) (“In Hart’s system, therefore, a legal rule of obligation (imposing legal obligation) is 
created whenever the relevant officials make the appropriate manipulations under the 
secondary rules of the legal system.”).  
212  HART, supra note 10, at 103.  
213  d. at 217-18.  
214  Id. at 103-04.  
215  Hart adds two other characteristics of an obligation: (1) the obligation is thought 
to be important “because they are believed to be necessary to the maintenance of social life 
or some highly prized feature of it”; (2) the obligation, while benefiting others, may 
“conflict with what the person who owes the duty may wish to do” and thus it is “thought 
of as characteristically involving sacrifice or renunciation.” Id. at 87. See Green, supra note 
12, at 517. In this sense, an obligation demands compliance. See supra note 208.  
216  As categorized in the empirical analysis here, these cases are the “application” 
cases. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. The courts applied the concept of 
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They legitimize shareholder primacy through a judicial rebuke of perceived 
deviations from a legal obligation.217 The opinions are consistent with the 
large body of judicial literature across many jurisdictions and over several 
decades. Furthermore, the recent rise of dutification cases in lower court 
opinions are not a signal of a move toward an enforceable duty.218 Instead, 
they unambiguously express the judicial expectation of the obligation. They 
function at the level of expressive value.219 The rule of law, not social norm, 
has resulted in today’s strongly shareholder-centric economic orientation 
in corporate governance.  
Shareholder primacy also has both external and internal aspects. The 
volume of judicial literature over several decades clearly show that courts 
have recognized shareholder primacy. Courts accept arguments based on 
shareholder primacy; they embrace the concept as a part of the reasoning 
process toward judicial outcomes; they incorporate the concept in other 
principles and rules of corporate law. The rule of shareholder primacy is 
not simply a pronouncement by a few courts or even important courts such 
as Delaware’s. In this sense, it is not simply the occasional dictum of judicial 
rumination on best practices, which would not rise to the level of a rule of 
law. Instead, courts have embraced the obligation pervasively, across many 
jurisdictions, and over several decades. The weight and seriousness of the 
concept is apparent. These collective judicial actions have recognized a legal 
obligation. This obligation has been internalized by managers and 
shareholders.220 Courts have directed this internalization by focusing the 
business community toward a single common objective. 221  
                                                                                                                                     
shareholder primacy in the process of reasoning toward the case holding with respect to 
the distribution of dividends and the application of a poison pill defense.  
217  Ford’s honest confession of an altruistic motive earned the court’s rebuke. See 
Strine, supra note 4, at 148; Macey, supra note 8, at 183.  
218  See supra Section III.C. & Chart 5.  
219  See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1650-51 & n.2 (2000) (“The thesis is that law influences behavior independent of the 
sanctions it threatens to impose, that law works by what it says in addition to what it 
does.”);  Sunstein, supra note 123, at 964 (“Many laws have an expressive function. They 
‘make a statement’ about how much, and how, a good or bad should be valued. They are 
an effort to constitute and to affect social meanings, social norms, and social roles.”).  
220  See supra Sections III.B. and III.C.  
221  “[L]aw facilitates coordination by making a particular outcome salient; law’s 
requirements focus individuals’ attention on one way to coordinate, channeling their 
behavior in that direction.” RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 22 
(2015). Coordination to a single objective is consistent with agency cost theory of the firm, 
which says that an agent must be given a single objective, lest the agent will pursue his 
own interest and agency cost will increase. Jensen, supra note 48, at 238; EASTERBROOK & 
FISCHEL, supra note 51, at 38. Thus, shareholder primacy can be seen as a legal focal point 
that coordinates the behavior of managers toward a single goal.  
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Enforceability is not a precondition of efficacy. Unenforceability does 
not inevitably result in inefficacy, and thus perhaps delegitimization. Most 
commentators, including critics, conclude that shareholder primacy has 
been internalized by a consensus of all relevant constituents.222 This fact 
predicts significant compliance without the need for enforcement. Not all 
laws are coupled with a meaningful sanction.223 Examples from other laws 
show that law may work through expressive value.224 This is not to suggest 
that regulatory rules without sanctions are a standard form of law. Most 
regulations work through enforcement. Although much of corporate law 
enables the private ordering of economic actors,225 shareholder primacy—
to the extent that it prescribes managerial behavior through a rule of law—
is regulatory in character.226 However, shareholder primacy cannot take the 
form of a rule‒sanction because the structure of corporate law would 
become internally incoherent.227 And, efficacy does not require this form of 
law. A rule‒no sanction form is seen in law when a rule can still achieve 
compliance through other means.228  
 
C. Complete Shareholder Primacy 
 
                                                                                                                                     
222  See supra note 6.  
223  States have legislated a duty to rescue, which is contrary to the common law of 
torts, but the sanctions are so light that these laws are best understood as having an 
expressive function. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519; WISC. 
STAT. § 940.34. There are laws against cursing in public with de minimis penalties. See MICH. 
COMP. L. ANN. § 750.103; R.I. GEN. L. § 11-11-5. Federal statute prohibits disrespect of the 
flag, but provides no penalty. 4 U.S.C. § 8(h). The field of international law must generally 
contend with obligations without sanctions. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 421 
(2000); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
171 (2010).  
224  See supra note 219.    
225  See supra note 203.  
226  On this point, there is apparent tension in corporate law. Statutory corporate law 
is enabling in that it allows a corporation to pursue any lawful activity. See supra notes 19 
& 203. However, case law is regulatory in that shareholder primacy obligates managers 
through law to pursue profit maximization. This tension is resolved if the statute is read as 
prohibiting a corporation from pursuing unlawful activities. See In re Massey Energy Co., 
2011 WL 2176479 (Del.Ch. 2011). Assuming that the corporation’s activity is lawful, the 
corporation has an obligation under case law to maximize profit. Corporate law is 
regulatory in this respect.  
227  See supra Section I.B.  
228  Leslie Green, Introduction, HART, supra note 10, at xxx.  
Vol. 102 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 53 
 
 
 
      
                                                                                                                                         
Court have imposed the obligation of shareholder primacy on the 
entire spectrum of managerial decisions. Although this obligation is 
unenforceable, it exerts serious social pressure to comply. But we are still 
left with the question: How exactly is the pressure applied since an 
unenforceable rule can be seen as a paper tiger? Why do managers obey a 
rule that cannot be enforced against them?  
We start with the basic premise: Shareholder primacy and primacy of 
managerial authority cannot coexist in a rule‒sanction form. The legal 
mechanism of shareholder primacy must solve a doctrinal puzzle: (1) the 
primacy of managerial authority is a rule‒sanction, and as such it is a first 
order rule in that it has independent dignity; (2) shareholder primacy is a 
rule‒no sanction, and as such it is a second order rule in that it is 
subordinate to any first order rule at the level of enforcement; (3) however, 
the purpose of the first order rule is to serve the second order rule at the 
level of prescription and substantive content, and as such the latter must be 
efficacious in spite of the former. When the doctrinal and jurisprudential 
problem is framed in this way, we see why the legal status of shareholder 
primacy has been opaque for so long.229 
As a matter of practice and theory, the law of shareholder primacy only 
works as a coupling of first order and second order rules. The legal 
mechanism of shareholder primacy resolves the tension between the two 
rules. It enables the second order rule to exert a conditional obligation on 
the first order rule and do so efficaciously.230 Compliance without sanction 
achieves two important functions: it is efficient because there are no 
additional litigation costs; and, it preserves the rule of managerial authority 
and thus the coherence of the basic structure of corporate law.  
The law and the legal system writ large achieve broad compliance 
through the following pathways: legitimacy of obligation, positive and 
negative incentives on managers, litigation risk imposed on managers, and 
social norm in the business community.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
229  See supra Section I.  
230  See supra note 6 and Section III.A.  
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First, corporate law and the legal system advance shareholder primacy 
as a legal obligation through positive and negative incentives inherent in 
performance-based executive compensation and the market for corporate 
control, as well the imposition of duties toward shareholders in the Revlon 
zone and inter-security conflicts.231 The combination of these laws partially, 
but substantially, motivate managers to comply with shareholder wealth 
maximization. 
Second, empirical evidence shows that courts have pervasively and 
over a long period embraced shareholder primacy. Courts have used the 
concept of shareholder wealth maximization both at the factual and legal 
levels of analysis. 232  This judicial embrace has legitimized shareholder 
primacy and given it the cloak of legal authority.  
Third, judicial recognition of an obligation creates legal uncertainty and 
litigation risk for corporate managers. The incentive, then, is to comply with 
the rule even though the obligation cannot be enforced as an independent 
duty. Courts weigh whether a manager has complied with shareholder 
primacy in the analysis of whether other rules were violated or not. Under 
this consideration, compliance is simply the path of least resistance given 
the negative incentives. The grant of fiduciary duty only to shareholder 
ensures that only unsatisfied shareholders can bring a derivative suit 
against managers when they fail to maximize profit.  
Fourth, obligations can legitimize and strengthen norms. This 
institutionalization of a social rule through a judicially announced 
                                                                                                                                     
231  Supra Section II.  
232  Supra Section III.  
Figure 2:  Complete Shareholder Primacy
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obligation is critical to the need to obey and actual compliance.233 Courts 
have validated the normative policy rationale for shareholder primacy held 
by the academic, policy, and business communities. Thus, alongside the 
legal obligation, there is a norm in the community, and its strength is 
measured by the degree of compliance with the principle of wealth 
maximization even if there is little risk of a sanction for business decisions 
falling within the business judgment rule.  
When these four factors are considered in totality, the legal mechanism 
of shareholder primacy is clear and complete. Corporate law achieves a 
harmonization of the first order and second order rules with dual efficacy. 
A board manages the business and affairs of the corporation, and she has 
vast discretion under the business judgment rule to consider the balance of 
interests among shareholders and other constituents. 234  The primacy of 
managerial authority is enforceable in court, and courts frequently enforce 
it in favor of management when shareholders seek to encroach upon 
board’s authority. 235  Such enforcements in favor of management and 
against shareholders is unremarkable. However, managerial behavior and 
actions are nonetheless steered toward shareholder interest through 
multiple rules, incentives, and justifications provided by courts and the 
legal system.  
The realm of all management decisions can be broadly categorized into 
decisions relating to takeovers, financing, and operational decisions of a 
going concern. In takeovers and financings, Revlon and inter-security 
priority doctrines enforce shareholder primacy in the form of rule‒
sanction.236 Because these transactions typically involve significant monies, 
the chance of avoiding detection and escaping judicial review are slim. The 
threat of sanction is direct and real, which applies negative incentives.  
Takeovers and financings, however, are specific transactions. The vast 
                                                                                                                                     
233  Leslie Green argues that an account of obedience to law is grounded in part on the 
law’s institutionalization.  
 
First, law is institutionalized: it is the product not only of human thought 
and action and in that sense a social construction; it is more significantly 
the product of institutionalized thought and action. Nothing is law that is 
not in some way connected with the activities of institutions such as 
legislatures, courts, administrators, police, and so on. Neither ideal social 
norms nor general social customs, but only an institutionally relevant 
subset of these, count as law.   
 
Green, supra note 12, at 523. See HART, supra note 10, at 103.  
234  See supra notes 33, 40 & 41 and accompanying text.   
235  See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.  
236  See supra Sections II.A. and II.B.  
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majority managerial decisions are operational decisions made in the context 
of a going concern. In this realm, managers have great discretion under the 
first order rule of managerial authority to comply with the obligation of 
shareholder primacy or not, depending on their preference or values (the 
classic agency cost theory in corporate law). They are generally safe from 
sanction since there is no enforceable duty. However, there are many non-
sanction checks arising from law that constrain a manager’s virtually 
unfettered discretion under the first order rule. The legal system provides 
corporate manager’s carrot-and-stick incentives. Executive compensation 
and the market for corporate control provide complementary incentives 
and align shareholder and manager economic interests. In light of 
normative arguments and the business community’s acceptance of them, 
the path of least resistance—paved by courts—is also the internalized norm 
of most managers. 237  These combined factors push managers toward 
compliance with the rule of law.238  
Although there is no duty to maximize profit, the threat of real sanction 
exists, albeit indirectly. Managers understand that other rules of corporate 
law exist in a rule‒sanction form. Those rules are connected to the principle 
of shareholder primacy. For example, Revlon applies only in a change of 
control context, but the context may be open-textured and the precise 
geography of Revlon remains uncertain. In any takeover transaction where 
a change of control is arguable, corporate managers are incentivized to 
maximize shareholder profit. The decisions in Dodge v. Ford and eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark are prime examples of indirect sanction 
through other enforceable rules (viz. rules on dividend distributions and 
takeover defenses), since it is clear in both cases that the court rebuked the 
controlling shareholders’ rejection of the profit motive.239  
Courts have applied and integrated the concept to the legal reasoning 
process and rule justification.240 It would be reasonably apparent to a board, 
typically advised by sophisticated corporate lawyers, that shareholder 
primacy may be a factor in the liability determination of these rules. When 
the boundaries of a rule is uncertain and the law is applied in an open-
                                                                                                                                     
237  See Rock, supra note 72, at 1988 (“Managers now largely think and act like 
shareholders.”).  
238  See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 5, 96-
217 (2016) (arguing that law affects behavior through three principal factors: positive and 
negative incentives, peer pressure, and internalization of rules).  
239  See supra note 216; Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its 
Implementation under Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 425-30 (2014).  
240  See supra Section III.C.  
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ended and potentially ex ante indeterminate,241 law and economic literature 
has shown that the uncertainty can lead to over-compliance as parties may 
be incentivized to take additional precautions.242 Thus, there is always the 
threat of indirect liability even though the legal form is a second order rule.  
Finally, to understand the role of courts in creating the obligation of 
shareholder wealth maximization, consider this counterfactual: What if, 
over the period 1980‒2016, courts had pervasively rejected or softened the 
idea of shareholder primacy? This alternative world is not so farfetched. In 
the landmark case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the majority Supreme 
Court claimed that while “it is certainly true that a central objective of for-
profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not 
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything 
else, and many do not do so.”243 Of course, it is not too cynical to believe 
that this liberal-sounding statement was an instrumental rationale, unique 
to the case and the issue of corporate religious liberty at hand.244 But in a 
counterfactual world, what if courts across the land had consistently 
admonished shareholders and managers that “modern corporate law does 
not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of 
                                                                                                                                     
241  Delaware law is contextual and open-ended, and thus indeterminate in outcomes. 
See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 459; Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market 
for LLC Law: A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 224 (2011); 
William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2009). 
242  See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of 
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984). If uncertainty 
is distributed normally around the optimal standard of care, the legal rule will have an 
over-deterrence effect because a cost-benefit analysis may militate taking more precaution 
at the margin to comply. Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit 
Rating Industry, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 85, 132 (2013).  
243  134 S.Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).  
244  The Supreme Court has been trending toward a pro-business bias for several 
decades. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the 
Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431, 1450, 1470-71 (2013). From the perspective of 
corporate law, the above quoted language in Hobby Lobby sounds liberal in its rejection of 
a singular profit motive, but the case is unquestionably a pro-business decision because it 
expands corporate personhood and rights. All five Justices in the majority (Alito, Roberts, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) are ranked in the top 10 pro-business Supreme Court 
justices for the period 1946‒2011, and the opinion author (Alito) is ranked first in this list 
followed by Roberts who is second. Id. at 1450. Citizens United and Hobby Lobby challenge 
the traditional “conservative theory” of corporation law based on profit maximization. Leo 
E. Strine & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Court?: The Tension Between Conservative 
Corproate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 336-38 (2015). The two 
cases also challenge conventional concept of corporate separateness. Amicus Curiae Brief of 
Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in Support of Petitions in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. at 3-13 (Jan. 2014).  
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everything else” and had reasoned through and decided cases based on this 
principle? There would not have been a legal obligation to maximize profit. 
Corporate governance and perceptions of legal obligations are products of 
corporate law, and courts have the power to create or validate a rule of law. 
Since law can legitimize or delegitimize social norms, there would not even 
have been a strong norm in the business community. Instead, there would 
have been only schools of intellectual thought in the academic community.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Shareholder primacy is law, and not just a social norm. Case law since the 
1980s shows that courts have embraced the concept. The legal mechanism of 
shareholder primacy is not a single locus rule‒sanction form. It is in the 
form of a legal obligation. Courts have legitimized and imposed the 
obligation to maximize shareholder profit across the entire spectrum of 
managerial decisionmaking. The principle weaves through a series of 
corporate law rules and the architecture of the corporate and market 
systems. A legal obligation is the only form of law that is coherent in light 
of the primacy of managerial authority. By legitimizing shareholder 
primacy without creating a duty, the law harmonizes the conflict between 
authority and accountability.  
The legal mechanism that begets and advances the idea of shareholder 
wealth maximization is complex, efficacious, and efficient. It is complex 
because it must harmonize the coupling of first order and second order 
rules that is unique to corporate law while respecting the independent 
dignity of both rules. It is efficacious because the rule of law has been 
internalized without the coercion of sanctions. It is efficient because the rule 
achieves compliance at systematic, predictable levels at minimal cost. 
Whether the rule is socially efficient, equitable, or ethical—all contestable 
points—is in the domain of a normative theory. However, the normative 
debate and policy prescription must be informed by a positive theory of 
law. Whether law exists or not matters. The cause and effect of shareholder 
primacy rests on a legal foundation, and not some general notion of 
collective social belief that perhaps can change with enough suasion or 
argument. Any policy prescription from a normative theory must address 
the fact that there is a law of shareholder primacy.  
